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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
A three year old passenger in the van was killed and five others injured, in a crash 
caused by a truck driver after he apparently fell asleep at the wheel (Davies 1995). 
Six year old Patricia Rodriguez was struck by a piece of lumber which flew off a 
top rack of a contractor's truck in Washington, Missouri. The piece of lumber flew 
through the window and penetrated her skull. She survived but now wears a helmet to 
protect the portion of her skull which had to be removed because of the damage (Magnan 
1991). 
Accidents involving big rigs seem to be spread across front pages of newspapers, 
are the main stories on news reports and are brought up in many conversations. Are there 
more accidents in the trucking industry compared to other jobs? Are accidents just a cost 
of doing business? "Incidents almost never result from a single cause but develop through 
well defined sequences of performance errors, process changes, oversights and omissions" 
(McCallister 1993). There is a need to promote and ensure safety on the roads that we and 
our loved ones travel upon. The trucking industry needs a safety program, that is 
designed for it, believed in by managers and practiced by drivers. The program needs to 
define the problem and address the oversights and omissions, then the companies need to 
practice the program in day-to-day activities.  The Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA), Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) and Triodyne Inc. have developed such a 
program called Accident Counter Measures (ACM). 
The OMC is an agency within the Department of Transportation's pun Federal 
Highway Administration. The OMC regulates and supports the nation's interstate 2 
commercial motor carrier industry. The OMC mission is to help move people, goods and 
commercial vehicles on our Nation's highways in the most efficient, economical, and 
crash-free manner possible. The ultimate goal is a crash-free commerical transportation 
environment. The ACM is one of the tools utilized by OMC in attempt to meet this 
ultimate goal. 
ACM is the result of a DOT investigation into the primary causes of commercial 
vehicle accidents and the development of countermeasures which could be used to 
improve traffic safety.  The focus is on improved safety management, preventive 
maintenance and defensive driving. There is a manual, designed to be used by safety 
managers to promote dialogue among its staff relating to vehicle accident analysis and 
prevention. Both maintenance personnel and drivers can benefit from reviewing and 
practicing the many safety tips provided specifically for their area of responsibilities. 
Once an accident occurs, it can be investigated and ACM can be applied. The ACM uses 
the notion that a preventable accident is one wherein the driver and/or carrier failed to 
act in a reasonably expected manner to prevent it.  Thus, the manual presents 
countermeasures which seek to improve both the carrier and the driver's performance. 
The manual contains a table of typical accident situations and is keyed to individually 
numbered countermeasures or guide sheets. For each accident situation, some potential 
causes are listed, together with principal and secondary countermeasures which may help 
to address those causes. Each countermeasure referenced in the table is fully described on 
an individual sheet which contains tips and questions intended to prompt the reader to 
focus on strategies that could be implemented to counter the indicated accident situation. 3 
If a Safety Investigator for OMC is reviewing the accidents, each accident and 
circumstance is entered into the computer ACM program and the program addresses 
different items that may have been a factor in a given accident. At the completion of the 
review, all of this is presented to the carriers and drivers and hopefully prevent occurrence 
of accidents of the same or similar nature. The consulting engineers and scientists of 
Triodyne Inc. designed the manual to address accidents which can be prevented through 
reasonably expected performance by drivers and carriers. The FHWA defines these 
accidents as "preventable" meaning that the driver could have prevented the accident from 
occurring. The manual presents means for improving performance, thus reducing the 
number of accidents. 
1.1 Need for the Study 
The need for this study is clear, in 1996 there were 4,740 commercial motor 
vehicles involved in fatal crashes in the United States, resulting in 5,126 deaths. This 
number represents 12 percent of all people killed in traffic crashes.  There were an 
estimated 94,000 trucks involved in injury crashes and an estimated 296,000 involved in 
property-damage only crashes in 1996. A large majority of these truck crashes occurred 
in good weather, during the day and on weekends. In Oregon alone in 1996, truck 
tractors were listed to be involved in 1,381 accidents and straight trucks were involved in 
an additional 934. Here is a brief summary of the history of truck crashes within the state 
of Oregon: 4 
Table 1.1 History of Oregon Truck Crashes 
1991  1992  1993
 
Commercial Motor Vehicle Crashes  1,468  1,329  1,329
 
Fatalities  75  55  77
 
Injuries  679  637  663
 
Commercial Motor Vehicle/  879  817  813
 
Passenger Car Crashes
 
Fatalities  59  41  61
 
Injuries  488  456  480
 
Preventable Commercial Motor  805  737  779
 
Vehicle Crashes
 
Driver At-Fault  744  697  742
 
Mechanical  61  40  37
 
Commercial Vehicle Miles Traveled  2,529  2,313  2,460 
(VMT) millions 
Fatality Rate (per million VMT)  .030  .024  .031 
Registered Commercial Motor  n/a  n/a  39,697 
Vehicles  n/a  n/a  L3% 
% of Registered Vehicles 
Commercial Driver Licenses  n/a  77,125  84,641 
% of Licensed Drivers  n/a  3.4%  3.7% 
n/a = no data was collected, or the information was not available. 
1994  1995
 
1,203  1,142
 
65  69
 
569  545
 
735  683
 
43  47
 
404  399
 
730  665
 
691  621
 
39  44
 
2,460  3,442 
.026  .020 
42,086  47,738 
1.3%  1.4% 
93,477  97,916 
3.9%  4.2% 5 
How do the numbers for truck crashes compare to the magnitude of crashes of 
other vehicles operating on Oregon roads? The following table and graph will show. 
Table 1.2 1996 Oregon Motor Vehicle Accidents (by Vehicle type) 
Oregon Data 
1  Bus (Non School) 
2  Car-Light Van 
3  Moped - Scooter 
4  Motorcycle 
5  Motorhome 
6  Other 
7  Pedalcyclist 
8  Pedestrian 
9  Police Vehicle 
10  School Bus 
11  Self Propelled Farm Equip. 
12  Taxi, Ambulance, Hearse 
13  Truck Non Detachable Bed 
14  Truck Tractor 
Total Vehicles 
1996 
Number  Percent 
256  0.27% 
90,107  94.78% 
15  0.02% 
401  0.42% 
102  0.11% 
97  0.10% 
717  0.75% 
717  0.75% 
79  0.08% 
169  0.18% 
34  0.04% 
58  0.06% 
934  0.98% 
1,381  1.45% 
95,067 6 
Figure 1.1 1996 Oregon Motor Vehicle Accidents (by Vehicle type) 
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After reviewing the above Oregon statistics, a person may think that the numbers 
concerning large vehicles are low +  , however, the severity of the crashes involving these 
big rigs are generally larger than a two automobile crash just by sheer volume involved. 
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in 
1992 there were 12.8 million accidents that occurred, which resulted in damage costs of 
more that $72,000,000,000. These figures do not even include the hidden costs that are 
much harder to quantify, such as loss of customer relationships and loss of sales to 
competitors. NHTSA statistics show that when a worker has an on-the-job highway 
crash that results in injuries, the cost to that person's employer is more than $24,000. An 
off-the-job crash that results in injury costs the employer more than $18,000 (National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1996). "Zee Medical Service studied employee 7 
injuries and found that for every $200 paid by an insurance company for medical and 
compensation costs, the employer paid an additional $1,200 for the "hidden" costs" (Sticha 
1993). In this article, accurately titled "The Accident Iceberg", Mary Sticha obtained 
information from an insurance company and identified the hidden cost for a motor carrier 
involved in an accident to include; investigation and reporting costs, employee downtime, 
and temporary transportation. The numbers quoted are from a typical carrier with a fleet 
of 100 vehicles in which 25% are involved in an accident annually. The average cost for 
repair on a collision is $1,100 per accident while the total cost of the accident would be 
over $5,900. This would make the total annual cost of the fleet to be $148 ,274, Trucking 
companies, like any business, are out there to make an income. If their accidents were 
reduced, think of the extra money this carrier would have saved. By reducing just 10% 
of their accidents, they could have saved $14,827 and a 30% reduction would be $44,475. 
These savings alone could mean the difference of hiring new help, purchasing new 
equipment, or providing better benefits to employees. 
One would think that if a company had so much to gain by eliminating or 
controlling their accidents, that this would be common practice. However, in the age of 
companies downsizing, it seems that the first departments to go, is that concerning safety 
(Weber 1992). One study involves an accident cost impact model, developed by Anthony 
Veltri. His model states that most safety departments are seen as a cost center and the 
managers need to calculate the real economic impact that this department has on a 
company. "The accident cost impact model (the direct costs component) may have added 
significance for the safety function since this function generally operates as a cost center. 8 
As such, cost-volume-profit analyses will provide the safety manager with the data 
necessary to ascertain the economic impact of various safety programs on the overall 
profitability of the enterprise, thus justifying the budgetary existence of the safety 
function" (Veltri 1990). Some companies utilize the accident ratio to figure out what their 
"cost of doing business" will be. By calculating their miles and drivers, they will just 
assume they will be involved in a said number of accidents. This is the type of mind set 
that needs to be changed. Perhaps this is the reason that many agencies, both public and 
private, are starting to utilize the word crash or incident in place of the word accident. 
Just the word "accident" gives the feeling or implies that there is nothing a person could 
have done, that it happened by chance. If a model can show the owners of the company 
all of the direct and indirect costs created by each crash they are involved in, there would 
be less of a reduction in the safety functions of an organization. Anthony Veltri also has 
written information concerning the need to evaluate the safety function. Once a safety 
program is in place, the agency is encouraged to evaluate the efficacy, or the intended 
effectiveness and efficiency of that program, to provide data on the strategic value and 
operating leverage (Veltri 1992). A safety manager must win the backing of management 
by showing them that safety is an investment and potential profit center rather than a 
financial hardship (Tristch 1993). 
Many times there are trends that are occurring in the motor carriers accident, 
however, they need some assistance from an outside source to help identify it.  If a 
company has accidents and does not make it a practice to investigate and analyze each one, 
it may miss the chance to identify the problem. The ACM helps carriers formulate 9 
strategies that are reflective of their particular needs arriving from the circumstances of 
each accident. An example of an easy remedy is, when a carrier has an excessive amount 
of backing accidents, the practice of having each driver walk behind his truck and get a 
clear picture before getting into the truck and backing it up may be all it takes to reduce 
one companies accidents. A company may want to place rear vision camera systems to 
provide supplement to driver vision, these have been known to reduce a fleets backing 
accidents considerably (Brandt 1995). Other companies solutions may not be so simple 
nor inexpensive to correct. Either way, having the company review their accidents is 
good practice. In order to compare one company to another, a common practice is to use 
the accident ratio (AR). This is an industry standard accident measure, used to calculating 
accidents per million miles traveled. The formula is to take the total number of accidents, 
multiply it by one million and then divide that number by the total fleet miles. This 
figure is utilized by OMC as a factor in determining which carrier should receive a 
compliance review. 
Trucking is the nation's largest freight mode. The President of the American 
Trucking Association (ATA) states that the trucking industry employs 7.8 million people 
throughout the economy in jobs related to trucking activity and that trucks haul over 77 
percent of all manufactured goods and transport 43 percent of total tonnage shipped by 
modes, about 2.9 billion tons of freight annually (Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Surface Transportation, 1994, 65.) It is obvious that the numbers of trucks utilized and 
freight delivered is not going to decrease in the future, but that these numbers will only 10 
increase. We can not do anything about the number of vehicles, but ways must be found 
to reduce the number of crashes these vehicles are involved in. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to review the accidents within the trucking industry 
and to determine the effectiveness of the Accident Countermeasure. The following 
objectives were developed for this study: 
1) Identify carriers based in Oregon and acquire information on their accidents. 
2) Investigate the accidents of selected carriers and apply the ACM. 
3) Collect information regarding accident causation, contributing factors, predictors and 
recommendations for eliminating accidents. 
4) Collect follow-up data, measuring the application of ACM. 
1.3 Hypotheses 
HI: There is a difference in accident rates in 1995 (AR 95) between trucking 
companies which were exposed to the ACM program and trucking companies that were 
not exposed to the ACM program. 
H2: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Median Level of Driver experience for the trucking company. 
H3: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Average Length of Trip traveled by a vehicle for the trucking company. 11 
H4: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Total Out of Service Time, Vehicle Out of Service Time, or Driver Out of Service Time 
for the trucking company. 
H5: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Age 
of the Equipment used by the trucking company. 
H6: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Percent of Urban Driving for a vehicle used by the trucking company. 
H7: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Amount of Driver Turnover for the trucking company during the observed period. 
H8: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Miles Per Vehicle Driven in 1994 for the trucking company. 
H9: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Type of Payment provided to the drivers by the trucking company. 
H10: There is a difference between Drivers who were considered for the ACM 
program (number of accidents equal to or greater than 1) and the drivers who were not 
considered for the ACM program (number of accidents equal to zero). 
1.4 Definition of Terms 
Accident Rate - The rate at which accidents meeting the prescribed characteristics 
occur. Commercial Motor Vehicles tend to report Accident Rates as per million vehicle 
miles traveled. 
Allocation -An administrative distribution of funds among the states. 12 
Authorization Act Basic substantive legislation or that which empowers an agency to 
implement a particular program and also establishes an upper limit on the amount of 
funds that can be appropriated for that program. 
Commercial Driver's License (CDL) is a license issued by a State or other jurisdiction, 
in accordance with the standards contained in the Federal Regulations, to an individual 
which authorizes the individual to operate a class of a commercial motor vehicle. All 
drivers of vehicles over 26,000 or drivers who haul placarded quantities of hazardous 
materials must have CDLs. 
Federal Hazardous Material Regulations (FHMR) laws that govern the movement 
of hazardous materials. 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR)  laws that govern personnel 
operating hazardous materials. 
Fleet Size The total number of power units which a particular carrier owns or leases. 
Inspections inspections performed under MCSAP are conducted in accordance with 
the North American Standard developed by CVSA in cooperation with the federal 
Highway Administration. 
Interstate Commerce means trade, traffic, or transportation in the United States 
which is between a place in a state and a place outside of such State (including a place 
outside of the United States) or is between two places in a State through another State of 
a place outside of the United States. If you cross any border or transport a commodity 
that has crossed borders, you are generally interstate. 13 
Intrastate Commerce means any trade, traffic, or transportation in any State which 
is not described in the term "interstate commerce." If you operate solely within one state 
and your commodity never leaves the state, you are intrastate. 
Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP)  a partnership between the 
Federal and State Governments, focusing on similar goals at attempting to make the 
highways a safer place to be. 
Out-of-service A vehicle or driver found to be in violation of the regulations may 
be placed in this status and not allowed to operate until the violations no longer exist. 
State Enforcement Plan (SEP)  a contract or agreement made by the state to the 
federal government, outlining what they are going to accomplish throughout the year and 
how they are going to measure their effectiveness. 
1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
1.  The scope of this study was limited to carriers on the OMC census, the data base 
known as Safety Net. No independent assessment was made of the comprehensiveness of 
the lists, obviously, carriers not identified on the lists had no possibility of being selected. 
These carriers have applied for a DOT number and may or may not have been audited by 
our organization in the past. This study is restricted to the accident information obtained 
by existing motor carriers that are based in Oregon. 
2.  Eligible carriers were asked to furnish, voluntarily, historical data on their accidents 
and specifics concerning their company. While study participants and non-participants 
were shown to possess comparable safety histories, the voluntary nature of participation 
may have influenced other factors, such as carrier representation by fleet size. An owner­14 
operator may be extremely busy just trying to keep his vehicle on the road and may have 
chosen not to participate. 
3.  The person interviewed served as the spokesperson for the entire motor carrier and 
the information obtained was not verified by other means. The risk here pertains to both 
intentional and inadvertent bias. The respondents appeared to be exceptionally adept at 
estimating or tallying the total miles driven, however, absolute validation of the numbers 
were not possible. 
4.  Accident and mileage data, was then used to calculate and compare the relative rates 
of accidents. The quality of accident data was limited by the accuracy and thoroughness 
of the carriers own record keeping. 
5.  Discussions are restricted to the observed set of trucking companies who were 
considered in this study. 
1.6 Summary 
Accidents concerning motor carriers are continuing to take place on our roads, 
affecting our commutes, our families and our lives. The Federal Highway Administration 
and many other agencies are working on solutions to reduce the number of incidences. 
This chapter summarizes the need for this study and the objective of identifying causation 
of accidents. Given the stated limitations, the results of this study are two fold: to provide 
information to carriers on ways of improving their accident ratio, perhaps being capable 
of recognizing and reducing predictors of accidents, thus saving themselves large quantities 
of money and preventing injuries and lost lives to the public at large and to measure the 
effectiveness of Accident Countermeasures. 15 
CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
There have been many articles, studies, and research conducted on the issue of 
safety. People have created models, engineers have created improved technology, and 
regulatory agencies continue to enforce the compliance with the regulations, yet crashes 
are still continuing all around us. There are many causes of crashes, both vehicle and 
driver related. The National Truck Crash Profile 1996, states that driver-related crash 
factors were recorded for only 29 percent of truck drivers involved in fatal crashes with 
other vehicles, but the driver-related crash factors were recorded at 67 percent of truck 
drivers where the truck was the only vehicle involved in the fatal crash. It is difficult to 
determine the exact cause of many crashes, but some statistic suggest that only about three 
percent of at-fault motor carrier accidents are the result of equipment problems. An 
extensive literature search was conducted to find what reports, findings and studies are 
available on motor carrier crashes. 
2.1 Causation of Accidents 
Fatigue, Fatigue, Fatigue.  The majority of the literature search discovered 
concerning commercial motor vehicles and accidents were centered around or included 
a section on driver drowsiness and fatigue. This should not come as a surprise to anyone 
who has thought about the motor carrier industry and the nature of their jobs. The 
drivers must operate at all hours of the day, many times on irregular schedules, most of 
the time alone, doing nothing more than driving. Because of their far greater mileage 16 
exposure and other factors, commercial drivers' risk of being involved in a fatigue-related 
crash is far greater than that of non-commercial drivers. 
"Sleepy trucker faces prison term" were the headlines in the Statesman Journal on 
August 15, 1995. The article explains how the driver was responsible for killing a three 
year old girl and injuring fiver others, after he apparently fell asleep at the wheel. He was 
charged with first-degree manslaughter and pleaded no contest. During the investigation, 
he admitted that he had falsified his log book to make it look like he was not driving as 
much as he was (Davies 1995). "Maryland company on trial over driver fatigue" read 
another article in the USA Today on November 22, 1995. In this story, the company is 
accused of forcing the drivers to falsify and destroy logs in order to make it seem as of the 
drivers were obeying the federal laws (Fields 1995). 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reported in 1995 that truck-
driver fatigue was a contributing factor in 30 to 40 percent of all heavy truck accidents. 
The main elements they found to be critical were: the duration of the last sleep period; 
total hours of sleep during the previous 24 hours and fragmented sleep patterns. They 
made a recommendation to the FHWA to revise the hours of service regulations to ensure 
the drivers get more rest time (Private Carrier, January 1995). The regulations now state 
that a driver may drive 10 hours with 8 consecutive hours off duty or in the sleeper berth, 
and under certain circumstances, one may add two separate sleeper berth periods to make 
up the 8 hours total. The NTSB also recommended removing this special allowance of 
combining two separate sleeper berth periods, stating that this does not allow the driver 
to receive the amount of rest that a body needs. A symposium, consisting of nearly 600 17 
attendees, met to discuss driver fatigue and the recommendations of NTSB.  It was 
summarized in the Transport Topics, a newspaper designed for the trucking industry, that 
the attendees of the symposium agreed "that any effort to eliminate fatigue as a 
transportation hazard must go beyond tinkering with hours of service regulations to a 
basic change in modern society". They want to see a change in culture, similar to the 
significant change in the drinking and driving (McNamara 1995). Many people are 
beginning to realize that we need to make people aware of the problem at hand and begin 
changing attitudes and behavior, like McNamara, a doctor from the Highway Safety 
Forum on Fatigue, Sleep Disorders and Traffic Safety was quoted as saying " I believe that 
we are awakening to sleepiness as a silent killer on our roadways just as we awoke 30 years 
ago to the need for passive restraints and the dangers of drunk driving" (Dinges 1993). 
There is an organized group called Parents Against Tired Truckers (PATT), which 
was started by parents who lost their children in road accidents linked to truck drivers 
who were fatigued. They act as a support group for one another but their main focus is 
campaigning for tougher laws governing drivers hours of service and stronger actions 
taken against those breaking the rules. An example of a bill proposed by PATT, is that 
which was passed in 1995 by Maine. If it can be shown that the driver "knowingly and 
intentionally" violated regulations and the accident which caused serious injury or death 
was "foreseeable" then the driver may face felony charges under Maine's trucking laws 
(Strah 1995). 
Another factor of fatigue, is a sleep disorder. Kim Painter of the USA Today states 
that 78% of long-haul truckers have such sleep disorder A study conducted by Stanford 18 
University researchers state that nearly 8 out of 10 long-haul truckers had some degree of 
sleep apneea, in which breathing problems caused short awakening throughout the night. 
The researchers stated there was a very high prevalence and believed that some of the 
contributing factors may be obesity, smoking and erratic sleep schedules (Painter 1995). 
Commercial drivers as a group are more obese than the rest of the population. 
The biggest question that must be answered when looking for solutions for 
fighting fatigue is one that has been pondered for a long time, how does one gauge fatigue 
and determine what conditions will consistently occur after prolonged driving. People 
can not predict nor judge the exact moment they are about to fall asleep and when they 
are driving and feel drowsy, most do not pull over and get the needed rest. People believe 
that they can overcome their tired feelings by turning up the music or having cold air 
blow on them, when studies now show that if a person is deprived of sleep, their bodies 
need them to make up this needed sleep and no amount of stimulation will deter the 
drowsy feeling for long (Canadian Trucking Association 1996). There are massive studies 
being conducted in the ways of measuring driver's physiology, alertness and performance, 
including driving task performance, performance on simulators, video monitoring of the 
driver's face and physiological measurement being taken (Ohm 1995). 
Alcohol and drug use of the truck drivers is a large concern of the motoring public. 
The fear of having the operator of an 80,000 pound rig, barreling down the interstate is 
in many peoples mind. Regulations require that drivers required to have a CDL, must 
participate in drug and alcohol testing. Companies must ensure that their drivers receive 
pre-employment testing and must have a random testing program in place.  Studies 19 
indicate that the frequency of drug and alcohol use is not as large as one might speculate, 
in fact, the FHWA issued a Federal Register on January 14, 1998, stating that carriers may 
reduce their random alcohol testing rate to 10 percent, compared to the previous 
requirement of 25 percent. The reason for this change is that the violation rate was found 
to be 0.14 percent in 1995 and 0.18 percent in 1996. Because the violation rate was below 
0.5 percent for two consecutive years, FHWA lowered the required testing rate. The rate 
for positive controlled substance testing was 2.6 percent in calendar year 1994, 2.8 percent 
in calendar year 1995 and 2.2 percent in 1996. 
The rate of alcohol involvement in crashes differ  significantly between 
Commercial Motor Vehicles and the passenger cars. A study listed in the Truck and Bus 
Accident Factbook 1994 (50) Table V-6 and V-7, includes the following numbers: 
Table 2.1 Driver Alcohol Use by Commercial Motor Vehicles 
Alcohol Use  Total Vehicles in Crashes  Percentage 
No  144,000  96.1 
Yes  5,000  3.1 
Not reported  1,000  0.6 
Total  150,000  100.0 20 
Table 2.2 Driver Alcohol Use for Passenger Cars 
Alcohol Use  Total Passenger Cars  Percentage 
No  3,066,000  91.5 
Yes  284,000  8.5 
Total  3,350,000  100.0 
These tables reflect the information of alcohol use as it was reported by the police 
for drivers involved in traffic accidents in 1994. The police reported rate for truck drivers 
was at 3.1% compared to the rate for passenger cars at 8.5%, a rate almost three times 
higher than for truck drivers, The reason for the difference that was noted in the study 
indicated that trucks are typically used for work and business purposes, while passenger 
cars are generally used for recreation and alcohol consumption is more likely to occur. 
These figures only include the police reported rates and actual rates of use are probably 
higher, however, the ratio between truck and passenger use rates would likely remain 
similar. In Oregon, the number of truck drivers caught with alcohol or drugs in 1996 was 
23. 
Included along with driver factors, one has to take a look at the experience of the 
individual. American Trucking Association has cited figures for the turnover rate at many 
for-hire truckload carriers at 100% each year, some even reporting a 200% annual turnover 
rate. "The trucking industry is losing billions of dollars annually to the black hole of 
driver turnover." The costs of replacing and training another driver runs between $3,000 
and $5,000. Assuming a turnover rate of 30%, the trucking industry would lose $1.8 to$3 
billion annually, based on the nation's two million drivers (Galloway 1995). Some of the 21 
retention problem concerns equitable benefits for hours and time committed. Life of a 
driver who must travel across the country is difficult. They have to be away from their 
house, their loved ones and sacrifice almost all attempts of a regular lifestyle.  If good 
drivers are not being compensated fairly then they will move on to another company who 
will meet their needs. So, who are these companies hiring? Are they experienced drivers, 
who consider themselves professionals, renegade truckers, who try and ditch the laws or 
inexperienced young people, maybe just graduating from a training school or someone 
with no driving experience at all? The experience of the drivers must be a consideration 
when taking a look at the accidents a company is having. "Accidents happen when you 
hire somebody new" is the main message expressed by James Feeney, president of a 
consulting firm.  His conclusion is based on an analysis of 198,109 accidents, which 
indicated that 54% of all the accidents occurred when the truck driver had worked for the 
carrier for one year or less (Cassidy 1995). When hiring a new driver, the company is 
supposed to do back ground checks on previous employment on that driver. However, 
many previous employers will only give out the required information, such as dates 
employed and previous drug test results. This latter information was only required to be 
released in the past few years. People are afraid of law suits and will not tell the next 
company if the driver they are about to hire is not a responsible employee. If they were 
able to tell everything they know, without any type of legal action against them, it would 
save some of the problems that trucking companies have with new hires. There are school 
available that help teach managers on hiring responsibly. The students at one school in 
Hopkiton, Massachusetts, are taught to evaluate and select new drivers and also spend time 22 
learning how to coach drivers to drive a truck properly (McNamara 1995). Not every 
company has the financial capability of sending their managers to such a school, but 
maybe a cost analysis on their losses due to bad decisions on new hires would justify the 
cost. 
Yet another driver factor that can not be overlooked is aggressive driving or road 
rage. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) says, about 66% 
of all traffic fatalities annually are caused by aggressive driving behaviors, such as passing 
on the right, running red lights and tailgating. With the change of society of always being 
on the move and the growing number of cars and trucks on the road, tempers seem to be 
on the rise also. Road rage was rarely discussed just a few years back, but now there are 
public service announcements, news coverage and many studies being conducted 
concerning this issue.  In order to quantify the extent of the road rage problem, the 
Automobile Association commissioned a survey of 526 motorist. The survey, carried out 
in January, 1995, found that almost 90 percent of motorist have experienced "road rage" 
incidents during the last 12 months. Sixty percent admitted to losing their tempers behind 
the wheel. Aggressive tailgating (62 percent) was the mst common form of "road rage," 
followed by headlight flashing (59 percent), obscene gestures (48 percent), deliberately 
obstructing other vehicles (21 percent) and verbal abuse (16 percent). One percent of 
drivers claim to have been physically assaulted by other motorists. Once it was thought 
that this type of behavior only happens in big cities, but it is happening here, in Oregon 
also. Oregon had more than 2.7 percent million vehicles registered in 1995 (Table MV-2, 
Highway Statistics 1995, 11-3) and this number will continue to grow, with the ever rising 23 
number of people moving here. There are a lot of vehicles operating on our roads. 
Congestion, schedules, and stress are just some of the factors involved in road rage. For 
a truck driver, the highway is their work place and he or she must deal with other drivers 
and tight schedules every single day. For most of us we may drive back and forth to 
work, but for a truck driver, they may be on the road for ten hours a day. Each event 
that takes place on a trip may just pile up and the driver may get frustrated. Professional 
drivers need to be taught constructive ways of dealing with the day to day happenings on 
the road (Inderbitzen 1995)(Gunnarsson 1996). 
Vehicle or mechanical problems are another area that needs to be addressed in the 
area of accidents . The headlines in one journal read "Three-Fourths of Vehicles Inspected 
Flunk in N.J." (Overend 1984). The national statistics are not that bleak for the industry. 
An annual, national 72 hour vehicle inspection event, known as Roadcheck, generally 
places about 25 percent of inspected vehicles out of service. In Oregon, the 1996 safety 
information notes that the ratio of the number of driver-caused crashes to those caused by 
mechanical defects is 12:1. The regulations require that a vehicle be inspected and routine 
maintenance be done. The vehicle is to be in a safe working condition prior to being 
driven on the road. The responsibility for ensuring the vehicle is safe is in the hands of 
the carrier, the mechanic and the driver. Oregon conducted 26,900 safety inspection in 
Oregon, and found an average of 2.75 out-of-service violations found per inspection. 
Carriers and driver alike, must ensure the vehicles are safe while rolling down the 
highway. "Good business practice dictates protecting the extensive financial investment 
represented by commercial vehicles" (Fiste 1989). 24 
Two more components concerning commercial motor vehicles that needs to be 
addressed are vehicle configuration and the weight of the vehicles. A commercial motor 
vehicle may be a bus, a straight truck, a tractor and trailer, or maybe even three trailers. 
Some people do not like to see the use of triple trailers on the highways, however, there 
is no indication that they are involved in more wrecks than double or single trailers. Just 
a few years ago in Oregon, the people had to vote on whether they should be allowed or 
not (Nolan 1998).  They are allowed, but can only be operated under restricted 
constraints. Truck size and weight issues are extremely complex. In a statement to the 
subcommittee on surface transportation, the administrator off FHWA, Rodney Slater 
stated, "Whether a given trailer length is safe depends mainly on inherent design 
properties, condition of maintenance, and the conditions under which it s used." He 
continues by discussing traffic, speed, vehicle characteristics, drivers ability and road 
design. Many of our roads are not designed to accommodate long trailers, so each states 
or city need to ensure the proper configurations are operated on the proper routes. "Good 
truck size and weight policy should ensure safe and efficient freight movement on our 
Nation's highway and intermodal systems" (Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Surface 
Transportation, 1994, 9). 
There are other factors than just the ones concerning the truck driver and their 
vehicle involved in accident causation and that is the action of the other vehicles on the 
road. The large trucks have limitations that many of the motoring public are not aware 
of. A big rig takes along time to stop, almost twice as long as a automobile. The truck 
has blind spots all around their truck, where the cars on the roads actually disappear from 25 
sight. In more than 60% off all fatal crashes involving autos and big trucks, police report 
that the auto driver rather than the truck driver contributed to the cause of death. 
Historically, this information was not available for driver education classes and not 
included in vehicle driver manuals, however this has been changing in recent years. 
2.2 Federal Highways Attempts to Reduce Accidents 
In this review of literature I must include a very important program that has 
proven to have a great impact on the safety of our highways. This program is known as 
the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) which is a joint partnership 
between the Federal Government and the States. One must know the history of MCSAP, 
the foundation, and it's accomplishments to appreciate where this program is today. The 
success of MCSAP had improved safety, made the trucking industry more professional 
and has joined the federal government and the states together to accomplish similar goals. 
In January of 1979, the Federal Highway Administration, Bureau of Motor Carrier 
Safety (BMC) (now known as Office of Motor Carrier (OMC), notified the states of the 
availability of a federal financial assistance program which would utilize state personnel 
to implement driver equipment inspections and expand vehicle weight measurement 
activities. The program was titled "The Commercial Motor Carrier Safety Inspection and 
Weighting Demonstration Program." The demonstration project was to ensure that a 
cooperative federal/state inspection and weight activity was feasible and effective. The 
project also encouraged the states to expand their commercial vehicle safety inspection and 
weighing activities. Four states were selected from twenty-five that applied, Utah, Idaho, 
Alaska and Michigan. The federal government stated they would allocate 90%, but the 26 
states would have to contribute 10%. These states entered into a contract, or cooperative 
agreement as it was officially called, which established certain tasks for each state to 
complete. Along with the outline of tasks, it also contained the objective of reducing the 
number of unsafe and overweight vehicles within the state.  To maintain uniform 
inspection requirements, the BMC provided training in the regulations and inspection 
procedures.  The officers were trained and the demonstration project became fully 
operational in February, 1980. 
By a visual selection procedure and a random sampling process, the officers were 
able to complete the vehicle inspections and furnish the results to the Bureau. There were 
a lot of complaints from the industry in the beginning of the project, but as it continued, 
the project developed into a professionally operated and impressive program, with solid 
public and industry support.  The results of the demonstration showed successful 
partnership and a reduction in commercial motor vehicle accidents. 
The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) was the beginning of 
MCSAP as we know it today. The STAA authorized the secretary of transportation to 
make grants for the development or implementation of programs for enforcement of 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), Federal Hazardous Material 
Regulations (FHMR) and compatible state regulations. In 1983, MCSAP was transformed 
into a "fairly respected inspection program, now involving some 2,900 primarily state 
officers, supported or supervised by some 560 administrative personnel" (Rothberg 1988, 
529). The Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (CMVSA) reauthorized MCSAP 27 
and gave Federal Highway the ability to incur obligations without waiting for 
appropriation based on the past year. 
Along came the Intermodal Surface Transportation Act of 1991 (ISTEA), 
reauthorizing MCSAP through 1997. Today, forty-nine States, the District of Columbia 
and 5 territories participate in MCSAP. States use MCSAP funds for numerous aspects 
of their truck safety programs. They may utilize their funds for personnel to inspect 
vehicles and driver records, conduct reviews of carrier operations, and promote public 
awareness of commercial vehicle laws and safety. States also may use funds to support 
truck weight enforcement, drug interdiction activities, uniform truck and bus accident 
reporting, Commercial Driver License (CDL) enforcement, hazardous materials 
requirements training, research and development, public education and enforcement of 
State traffic laws in conjunction with roadside inspections. No two States are the same 
and each Division of the OMC must oversee and assist in managing the States program. 
A new program being utilized by the regulatory agencies is called the Commercial 
Vehicle Information System (CVIS). CVIS is a program that is designed to identify all 
unsafe operations among the approximately 300,000 motor carriers in the U.S. A carriers 
safety performance will be reviewed, based on audits, accidents, roadside inspections and 
if they do not improve after found to be unacceptable, their state vehicle registration will 
be revoked (Craig 1995). 
Historically, the general public has been concerned with the use of drugs by the 
truck drivers and the transportation of drugs by the trucking industry. FHWA oversees 
a program known as the Drug Interdiction Assistance Program (DIAP). The objectives 28 
of this program are to remove commercial motor vehicles drivers who use illegal drugs 
for our highways and to intercept and seize illegal drugs being transported by the drivers. 
Between 1988 and 1996, DIAP programs around the country have resulted in seizures 
totaling more than 294,000 pounds of marijuana, 84,000 pounds of cocaine, 35 pounds of 
methamphetamine and over $10 million in currency. Regulations implemented to address 
the use of drugs by the industry is the requirement for drug testing and alcohol testing 
programs in all trucking companies utilizing drivers which require a CDL. These 
regulations require a company to perform pre-employment tests on a driver and to receive 
the negative results back prior to using this driver on the road. The companies must also 
conduct random drug and alcohol testing on a percentage of the drivers throughout the 
year. If the results of test come back positive, the driver can not operate a commercial 
motor vehicle until they have a result that states they are negative. In order to continue 
driving for this carrier, the positive driver must also enter a program to be evaluated by 
a specialist, follow the recommendations of that specialist, they must agree to enter a 
special random drug testing program and may jeopardize the ability to retain a CDL. 
The OMC has historically been an "Enforcement" agency, but has in recent years 
opened up their eyes and changed their focus toward being a "Safety" agency. This idea 
of being able to direct attention on an area other than enforcement has allowed 
development of programs such as "Share the Road" and the creation of the "No-Zone" 
campaign. These programs focus on the driver of all vehicles on the road, and not only 
on the truck driver. Since more than 60% of all fatal crashes involving autos and big 
trucks, the police report that the auto driver rather than the truck driver contributed to 29 
the cause of the crash, this is a good place for personnel and resources to be used. The 
"No-Zone" program is designed to educate the motoring public about truck limitations 
and to teach them how to steer clear of unsafe situations involving trucks. The brochures 
include the following five situations and recommendations on what to do when operating 
around large vehicles. The following was taken from the No-Zone brochure, publication 
number FHWA-MC-96-017: 
Backing up: When a truck is backing up, it sometimes must temporarily block 
the street to maneuver its trailer accurately. Never pass close behind a truck that 
is preparing to back up or is in the process of backing up. Remember, most 
trailers are 8 1/2 feet wide and can completely hide objects that suddenly come 
between them and a loading area. So if you try to pass behind the truck, you 
enter a (No-Zone) blindspot for you and the truck driver. 
Passing:  Another No-Zone is just in front of trucks.  One of the biggest 
mistakes you can make is to cut in too soon and slow down after passing a big 
truck. Because of their size and weight, trucks need a much greater distance to 
stop than cars. If you don't give them enough space, you run the risk of being 
hit from behind. So be sure to maintain a consistent speed when passing and 
don't pull in front of the truck unless you can see the whole front of the truck 
in your rear-view mirror 
Rear Blindspots: Unlike automobiles, trucks have deep blindspots directly 
behind them. If you tailgate, not only do you make it impossible for the truck 
driver to see you, but you also cut off your own view of traffic flow. So staying 
in the No-Zone is almost like inviting a collision. 
Side Blindspots: Trucks have much larger blindspots on both sides than cars do. 
When you travel in these blindspots for any length of time, you can't be seen by 
the truck driver. If the truck driver needs to make an emergency maneuver or 
change lanes, he won't be able to see you and a crash could result. 
Wide Turns: Because of their vehicles' size, truck drivers sometimes need to 
swing wide to manage their turns. When they do, they can't see cars directly 
behind them. So give them plenty of room and never try to squeeze around 
them. 
Working with trucking companies nationwide, OMC personnel have taken 
tractor/trailer configurations to numerous public outreaches and parked cars in the No-
Zone surrounding these vehicles. The public is then invited to sit in the truck driver seat 30 
and observe for themselves the actual scene that a truck driver has. Most people are 
surprised by the visual limitations surrounding a truck and trailer and many folks would 
never get the opportunity to sit in a commercial motor vehicle without this type of 
program. Oregon driver education teachers have welcomed OMC and the trucking 
industry to bring a vehicle and a driver to their classes.  It is great to be able to catch 
automobile drivers at such a young age, while they are just learning the skills to practice 
out on the road. Partnering with the USDOT and the Michigan Transportation Safety 
Commission, the ODOT Transportation Safety Section was able to print and distribute 
to most driver education classes in Oregon, brochures called "Semi Conscious, Driving 
in the Real World". Along with a video that was distributed by OMC, these brochures 
are designed for teenagers and describe in detail the same messages the No-Zone campaign 
is promoting. 
Several trucking companies have volunteered their trucks and drivers and have 
entered into a program known as the "Trucker Buddy" (Sprecker 1998). The Trucker 
Buddy adopts a classroom of a school and spends time with the students there. The 
drivers correspond through e-mail and letters while they are out on their runs. One 
sample of an e-mail I read from the driver informed the students of which state they were 
driving through, which route they were using and described some of the things that state 
was famous for. In the classroom, the teacher had the students research the specific state, 
find the capitol, bird and flower. The students also had to calculate the miles the drivers 
had operated that day and figure how much fuel was used. The teachers are able to 
involve the children in a real life situation and teach history, geography, math and many 31 
other skills all in one lesson. One set of Trucker Buddies that I work with, hold an essay 
contest with their students every year. In 1997 the students of Guy Lee elementary school 
in Springfield, Oregon were asked to write a story with the title "The Day the Trucks 
Stopped". There were some very creative minds working on this contest and once the 
stories were turned in and reviewed, the drivers held a huge assembly and invited students, 
teachers, parents and the local media to the school. The drivers presented awards to the 
children and had their vehicle in the parking lot so that all the people in attendance could 
get into it. Everyone who is involved in the program has expressed happiness with it and 
it is reassuring to know that these young minds will grow up knowing how to share the 
road with trucks. 
2.3 Oregon Practices 
The state of Oregon's lead agency is the Public Utility Commission (PUC), now 
technically called the Motor Carrier Transportation Safety Branch (MCTSB), but still 
known and referred to as the PUC. In addition to PUC, six law enforcement agencies 
participate in Oregon's truck inspection program.  They are the Oregon State 
Weighmasters, Multnomah County Sheriffs Department, Portland Police Bureau, 
Washington County Sheriffs Department, Marion County Sheriffs Office and the Oregon 
State Police. The PUC conducts carrier audits to ensure compliance with the regulations 
and along with the listed agencies, conduct vehicle inspections along Oregon's roads. 
The vehicles are selected either by random or on a visual selective basis.  If a 
vehicle has recently undergone and passed an inspection, there will be a valid sticker 
placed in the window by the previous inspector. Unless a obvious defect is seen, vehicles 32 
displaying a current sticker will be allowed to pass. Vehicles pulled into road side areas 
will be thoroughly inspected, along with the driver's credentials and log book. If any 
imminently hazardous defects are noted, the vehicle is placed out-of-service and can not 
be moved until the repairs are made. If minor vehicle problems exist or the driver is 
found to be in violation, this will be noted on the violation report.  If the drivers are 
found operating over the hours of service limitations, they are placed out-of-service until 
they have accrued enough hours to drive within the regulations. MCSAP also requires the 
states to take a look at the CVSA fine schedule for defects and structure theirs accordingly. 
Fines are to be "reasonable and appropriate...costly enough to deter unsafe practices but 
not harsh" (Strah 1992). 
Through the combined efforts of all the agencies, the PUC reported in their 1991 
Statistics & Summary that 27,217 trucks were inspected, 52,819 total vehicles, listing 
71,976 violations, an average of 2.64 violations per inspection. Of the number of vehicles 
inspected, 8,260 (16.31%) were placed out-of-service. Upon examining the drivers, 1,746 
drivers (6.6%) were not qualified in accordance with the regulations. 1,712 drivers (6.5%) 
were placed out-of-service for operating the vehicles in violations of the hours of service 
regulations. In 1996, there were 26,900 truck safety inspections conducted in Oregon, that 
would be one every 19 minutes. 
While there are large amounts of violations still found on the vehicles operating 
on our highways, the trends in accidents are improving. The number of Oregon truck 
accidents reported to the PUC in 1991 were 1,462, a decrease of 11.2 percent from 1990. 
Of these accidents, the PUC breaks them down into truck-at-fault accidents. These are 33 
the accidents defined as traffic accidents caused by the action of the truck driver, or due 
to improper load securement, or a mechanical defect on the truck. During 1991, there 
were 799 truck at fault (54.7 % of the total truck accidents), this is a decrease of 6.8 percent 
from 1990. In both of the total accident and the truck-at-fault categories, there has been 
a steady decrease each year since 1988. 1996 data for Oregon states that since 1980, there 
has been a decline of 26.1 percent change in the number of truck crashes and an increase 
of 27 percent change in truck miles traveled in Oregon. 
The intent of all the inspections is to promote safety, and everyone agrees 
(operators, corporate and governmental officials) that even though there is a "need to keep 
vehicles safe, to prevent crashes, to save lives and to prevent economic loss, unsafe trucks 
still roll down the highways. Reviewing inspection data available from member states and 
provinces of the CVSA could cause one to say that maintenance of safety equipment, like 
the weather, is something some folks only talk about" (Fiste 1989, 17). While I see the 
results from the inspections, I do not believe that maintenance is only "talked about". I 
do believe that some people have taken great steps to ensure that their vehicle are in top 
working order, but vehicles are put through a lot of wear and tear and the steps the 
companies initiate must be a continual process. 
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), along with the Commercial 
Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) run a competition for inspectors, a little something extra 
to make them strive to be the best they can be. Because competitors come from all over 
the country, the competition helps insures inspection uniformity is practiced (Strah, 93a). 
Uniformity is very important for drivers who operate through several different states. 34 
You wouldn't want some State allowing a certain defect and another fining the driver or 
putting him out-of-service for the item. The inspectors need to be efficient, professional 
and able to converse easily with the drivers as they inspect their vehicles. 
Turning the focus now, away from the truck drivers for awhile, the Oregon 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) has had a section in the Oregon Drivers Manual 
concerning Sharing the Road, but until recently, the section informing drivers on how to 
drive safely around trucks has been very limited. The 1998 version of the Drivers Manual 
has expanded the section on sharing the road with trucks and has even inserted a color 
photo of the No-Zone, described the limitations of the big rigs and listed suggestions when 
driving around them, much similar to the No-Zone brochures developed by FHWA. 
Working with the DMV, the PUC had many of the No-Zone posters re-sized, printed and 
laminated in order to be posted at each of the DMV locations around Oregon. The 
Transportation Safety Section of ODOT has applied and received a special MCSAP grant, 
designed to conduct public information and education outreach on the No-Zone. This 
section has utilized the money to purchase brochures, coloring sheets for young children, 
placemats, and small trinkets, each depicting a safety messageor a picture of the No-Zone. 
The brochures were disseminated to Oregon driver education teachers for use in their 
class rooms.  The placemats were distributed and utilized by several  restaurants in 
Oregon, some big chain restaurants volunteered to use them during special safety initiative 
weeks throughout the year.  Each year, ODOT partners with other safety oriented 
agencies and help sponsor the Grand Safety Station at the Marion County Fair. While this 
is not the only fair they present safety messages, this is by far the largest. Both children 35 
and adults can go through these station and become educated on fire safety, boating issues 
and numerous other safety messages. Many of the coloring sheets and trinkets are given 
out at these functions. 
2.4 Current Research and Initiatives 
There once was a time when we as an agency did not have a chance of enforcing 
regulations and actually spreading ourselves out enough to even make a difference, but with 
the progress that is being made by working together, there is hope. Since I started this job 
almost nine years ago, there has been continuous change, not only in our procedures, but 
also in our mission. People are always resistant to change, unless you can show them how 
it will help and I do believe that our agency is changing in the right way. Accidents were 
once reported to the FHWA by the carriers, but change has come and now this information 
is entered into a program called SafetyNet through the state police and local jurisdictions. 
SafetyNet is a nationwide computer system, mandated by The Motor Carrier Act of 1991. 
It contains data on drivers, vehicles and company compliance with the regulations. 
"SafetyNet will focus the attention of that beefed up field force on carriers known to have 
safety-related problems. Eventually, fleets with unsafe practices will have no place to hide" 
(Cross 1990). The purpose of SafetyNet is to "receive more accurate and standardized 
accident information with electronic filing by police investigators" (Cassidy, 1992). This 
change will take the burden off of the carrier and place it on a professional unit who is 
familiar with the forms and routines. 
The Commercial Driver's License (CDL) is intended to ensure that the drivers of the 
large vehicles are competent, professional people. The FHWA establishes qualifications and 36 
minimum standards that States must follow when testing commercial motor vehicle 
operators and issuing a CDL. At one time a driver could acquire many licenses from 
numerous states. Effective July 1, 1987 it became illegal for commercial vehicle drivers to 
possess more than one license. On April 1, 1992, anyone who operated a vehicle rated over 
26,000 pounds Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR), hauled placarded loads of hazardous 
material or transports more than 14 passengers had to get a CDL. Unlike most other 
Federal safety requirements, the CDL requirements cover intrastate as well as interstate 
operators. The issuing states are now a part of a central computerized repository of 
information on drivers, trying to ensure that each drivers receives only one license. Over 
7.6 million people have a CDL (Borba and Appel 1994). 
Some companies have taken additional steps in monitoring their drivers, to ensure 
safe practices on the streets. Since the safety managers of the fleet can not ride beside their 
drivers and keep an eye on their every move, many companies have opted for computerized, 
satellite technology that gives the vehicles real time location. Many vehicles are equipped 
with computers that automatically log the drivers hours of service and the company may 
even be able to receive this information while the driver is still making a trip. Yet another 
method that companies are relying on is not so high tech. It is simply a sticker placed on 
the rear of the trailer stating "How's My Driving" and then gives a number to call. One 
article stated that fleets with an effective program using these type of stickers and a toll-free 
number see an average accident reduction of 12% to 30%. A company which promotes such 
stickers, Fleet Safe Corp. guarantees a 10% reduction or you get your money back. People 
do take the time to call the companies and report the bad drivers (Berg 1995). 37 
Since most of the literature reviewed concerning commercial motor vehicles and 
accidents brought up the issue of driver fatigue, and a large section of this chapter included 
this serious problem, a proportional amount of space will be given to cover what solutions 
have been suggested or implemented. One way Oregon and many states across the nation 
are attempting to attack the fatigue issue is by placing continuous shoulder rumble strips on 
the highways. These rumble strips are large cut out pieces of the roadway or large bumps 
placed onto the roadway, at measured intervals. When hit by a drifting, tired driver, both 
the bouncing and jarring of the car or truck and the loud sound created, alerts the driver that 
it is time to pull over and get some rest. Rumble strips are not a new concept. They were 
first introduced on the Garden State Parkway in New Jersey in 1955, but they have taken 
a long time to be implemented. A study done in 1985 in the Mojave Desert indicates that 
there was a 46 percent reduction in single vehicle roadway departure crashes in areas that 
had rumble strips. Dr. Allan Pack, the director of the Center for Sleep and Respiratory 
Neurobiology at the University of Pennsylvania, believes that all major roadways should 
have them and states that they are inexpensive to install (Staff, 1997). An engineer for the 
New York State Department of Transportation stated that New York has achieved a 
reduction in both drowsy driving accidents and accidents due to inattention by between 70 
to 80 percent. The 1994 New York Task Force recommended that rumble strip installation 
needs to expanded throughout the state (Staff 1996). 
The sheer numbers of agencies that are available, concerned and working on 
solutions about fatigue issues helps reiterate the need for answers. There is the American 
Sleep Disorders Association, National Sleep Foundation (NSF), American Automobile 38 
Association (AAA), American Trucking Association (ATA), Students Against Destructive 
Decisions, Parents Against Tired Truckers, both Federal and State agencies and the list goes 
on and on. At the national level, many organizations are partnering together to take an 
active role in the struggle against drowsy driving. Information obtained from the ATA 
publication "The Trucking Industry's Efforts to Reduce Driver Fatigue" indicates that they 
will be undertaking a multifaceted action plan to fight fatigue.  They are investing 
tremendous energies and millions of dollars in their plan of five elements: research, rest 
areas, education and training, hours of service and countermeasures. The NSF is one of the 
primary national organizations focused on sleep and sleep disorders. Their campaign "Drive 
Alert...Arrive Alive"  has reached millions of Americans through public service 
announcements (PSA), media coverage, research forums and state-level programs and policy 
initiatives. The AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety launched a drowsy driving public 
awareness campaign and have designed and disseminated brochures, videos, cassettes and 
PSA's titled "Wake Up!" The cassette is designed to be listened to by the driver while 
operating their vehicle.  It educates the motorist with entertaining sketches, songs and 
humor. OMC has received many of these tapes and brochures and includes them along with 
their own brochure "Awake at the Wheel" in presentations and public outreach events 
sponsored. The "Awake at the Wheel" brochure also may accompany a video that was 
produced to educate truckers and their families about fatigue and the importance of adequate 
sleep. NHTSA is using $1 million Congressional set-aside to fund programs targeted at 
reducing highway crashes due to fatigue, inattention, and sleep disorders.  They are 
developing a prototype drowsy driver detection and warning system, conducting analysis 39 
and paying the states to incorporate a public information and education safety program 
centered around fatigue issues (Staff 1997). 
The 1995 FHWA sponsored Truck and Bus Safety Summit identified driver fatigue 
as the top priority commercial motor vehicle safety issue (USFHWA- OMC 1996). The 
OMC supports this designation and has allocated its resources accordingly. OMC is 
addressing fatigued drivers through research, technology, rulemaking, education/outreach 
and enforcement. Partnering with the motor carrier industry, OMC is undertaking an 
outreach effort to inform the general public, truck drivers and professional associations 
about drowsy driving. We currently have ongoing, nearly 20 research and technology 
programs relating to driver drowsiness/fatigue and hours-of-service, including the most 
comprehensive over-the-road study of commercial driver alertness ever conducted. Another 
OMC effort currently underway is the placement of work out facilities at truckstops. Sleep 
apnea studies show that there is a relationship between the sleep disorder and a person not 
being physically fit, so OMC is attempting to encourage truck drivers to get in shape while 
they are out on the road. Maybe instead of eating the well known greasy food that is located 
at the typical resting places, the drivers will take the opportunity to work out. On the 
enforcement side, each year more than 14,000 hours-of-service and log book violations are 
cited during compliance reviews of motor carrier operations. A joint study with the ATA 
Foundation showed that state officials report that 78 percent of public truck parking areas 
are full or overflowing at night and 84 percent of private truck stops report the same 
conditions. FHWA is working on expanding public rest areas and the trucking industry is 
promoting legislation to expand public rest areas and encouraging the development of 40 
private truck stops so that cars and trucks have adequate places to pull off the highway 
(USFHWA-OMC 1996). 
A nonprofit organization dedicated to reducing traffic crashes, the primary cause of 
lost work time and employee fatalities, Network of Employers for Traffic Safety (NETS) 
is a new public/private partnership worth looking into. NETS offers ongoing support by 
regularly researching, recording, improving and distributing the latest and most successful 
techniques for safety programs of all sizes.  This organization is not solely for trucking 
companies, but it is designed for every employer. They provide a variety of services, 
including networking, technical assistance, training, communications and public relations. 
The Oregon chapter of NETS is championed by the Oregon DOT and the local OMC 
division is a member (NETS 1995). 
2.5 Literature Summary 
Change has got to take place Behavior and attitude about driving while drowsy has 
got to change. Commercial motor vehicle driver fatigue is a complex issue, consisting of 
physiological and behavioral factors that need to be addressed. A drivers off duty behavior, 
lifestyle and sleep habits play a key role in determining his on the job alertness level. The 
equipment operated, the road they operate on, the hours they operate and whether it is 
during the day or at night all play a significant role. There is no one answer to stop fatigue 
related crashes from occurring, but there are many agencies concerned with this issue and 
many steps being taken in an effort to eliminate this type of crash. From training to 
enforcement, from vehicle engineering to rumble strips, there are numerous programs in 41 
place to improve fatigue management, but the bottom line is the driver needs to be in good 
physical shape and acquire the needed sleep that the individual drivers own body requires. 
Drivers need to work on changing the public image of a truck driver into a more 
positive image. They need to conduct themselves as professionals at all times out on the 
streets. Drivers can not indulge in alcohol and drugs while operating their commercial 
motor vehicles. The public wants to see courteous operators, not aggressive drivers, that let 
the frustrations get to them. 
Public education and outreach needs to include more information on sharing the 
road. The motoring public needs to be made aware of the limitations of large vehicles in 
terms of maneuverability, stopping distances and blindspots. Automobile drivers basically 
need to be taught how to drive around these trucks, because many crashes could be avoided 
if motorists were educated on these issues. 
Change that removes the sloppy, trashy vehicles out of the way for well maintained, 
defect free vehicles. MCSAP is the program that is designed to accomplish these goals and 
every time that a triple-trailer gets behind me on a steep down grade, I am glad to know that 
there are people out there checking these trucks brakes. MCSAP is not intended to break 
the little guys "just trying to make a living" it is trying to ensure that all the citizens have a 
safe road for them to travel on. 42 
CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
This study examined randomly selected motor carrier accidents to determine if 
significant differences existed between Oregon based trucking companies during the years 
1994 and 1995 who received the ACM provided by the FHWA and those who did not 
receive the ACM. 
The ACM are countermeasures which were developed to be used to reduce the 
incidence of Commercial Motor Vehicle accidents. It presents guides and tips to help drivers 
and safety supervisors formulate strategies which are reflective of the particular needs and 
circumstances of their company and will hopefully lead to improved driving safety. The 
ACM manual lists typical accident situations, lists of potential causes and then suggests 
certain countermeasure and tips intended to prompt the reader to focus on strategies that 
could be implemented to stop future similar accidents from occurring. The strategies may 
be directed either towards the improvement of the driver's performance or the motor 
carrier's procedures based on the situation surrounding each particular accident. The ACM 
manual also identifies selected books and resources for further information. 
3.1 Subject 
As an office, we formed an accident team to measure the effectiveness of the ACM. 
With the assistance of computer technology, MCSAP agencies utilize a network known as 
Safety Net. This system was created to track and target motor carriers using their inspection 
history and reported accident history. We utilized this database to determine which Oregon 
based carriers would be utilized in this study. From a complete list of trucking companies 43 
based in Oregon, the number of recordable accidents each company had during the 1994 
calendar year was observed.  These accident records are kept by the Department of 
Transportation and reflect the number of accidents reported during a calendar year and may 
not reflect the exact number of accidents that may have occurred, for some may have simply 
not have been reported. A simple random sample of fifty trucking companies were selected 
from the class of companies who did not have any accidents in 1994, however,  upon 
reviewing these records, five of the companies were found to be out of business. A simple 
random sample of fifty trucking companies were selected from the list of companies who 
reported at least one accident in 1994. This collection of ninety-five trucking companies 
represents a sample selected from our super-population of trucking companies defined by 
their recorded presence in the Department of Transportation database and their presence 
as a viable trucking company in the Oregon based trucking industry during the years 1994 
and 1995. 
The entire selected lists of companies were telephoned and a series of questions were 
asked (Appendix B). The team designed the questionnaires to collect data that may be 
utilized as a predictor or a link to an accident. There may have or may not have been 
previous indications that this information is related. 
The fifty trucking companies who recorded  an accident in 1994 were further 
subdivided, using a randomized mechanism, they were placed into two groups of 25. After 
the division was made, it was determined that one of the companies was a subsidiary of a 
company in the other group, so the accident team felt that both companies needed to be 
placed into the same group, since we could not visit one of these companies without having 44 
an effect on the second. This left our groups at the size of 24 and 26. The group of twenty-
four companies were than exposed to the ACM program. The group of twenty-six were not 
assigned a treatment and will be considered a control group from the WITH sub-population. 
This randomization allows our inference to be generalized to the collection of all vehicles 
who recorded an accident in 1994. It should be observed that trucking companies who did 
not record an accident in 1994 were not considered for the ACM program. This makes 
practical sense, since they did not have any accidents to review and no counter measures 
could be implemented. Unfortunately, as a consequence, we have subdivided our super-
population into two smaller populations and statistical inference can only be drawn to the 
sub-population consisting of trucking companies WITH a recorded accident. However, an 
indirect comparison of the two sub-populations will help us interpret and understand the 
effect of the ACM treatment on accident rates in the years 1994 and 1995. Let us define 
these two populations as the WITH (with a recorded accident in 1994) and the WITHOUT 
(without a recorded accident in 1994) sub-populations. 
Follow-up in 1995 of all the companies chosen for our study in 1994 led to the 
departure of thirteen of the selected companies. Some were out of business, but several 
simply refused to answer the questions or would not return telephone calls. While our 
agency has regulatory authority over these carriers, this survey was above the realm of the 
regulations and the carriers were not forced to participate. Appendix C describes the follow 
up questions. 45 
As a result, we have a total of 82 Oregon based trucking companies, each with data 
from two years (1994 and 1995) who comprise a sample of our super-population. There 
were 40 in the WITH sub-population and 42 in the WITHOUT sub-population. 
3.2 Instrument 
The OMC accident team designed a questionnaire as the instrument to receive 
pertinent information from each of the carriers participating in the study. The accident team 
developed the questions, utilizing their expertise and knowledge, to include information that 
may help indicate predictors of accidents. The questionnaire was made, reviewed and 
revised several times before the final product came through. We collected 21 elements from 
each of the carriers, plus accumulated information on 11 more elements from our computer 
system. 
Once the two groups of carriers were randomly selected, each were telephoned and 
asked the series of questions. Many carriers had to be called repeatedly, yet others responded 
enthusiastically, hoping for some answers to their accident problems. 
The WITH group was divided into two sub-populations of 24 and 26 carriers. The 
WITH group of 24 received an on-site visit from one of the members of the accident team 
and a review of their records was conducted. Each accident was thoroughly reinvestigated 
and was entered into the ACM computer system. This system analyzes the situations 
governing an accident and makes recommendations on how future accidents of this nature 
can be avoided. The Safety Manager of each company was given instructions to review with 
each of their drivers involved in accidents the countermeasures. They were also left an 
ACM manual and taught how to use it on future accidents within their company. 46 
At the end of one year, each of the carriers were contacted by telephone again, to 
answer yet another series of questions. We could not receive information from 8 companies 
due to the carriers moving out of Oregon or going out of business. Five companies simply 
refused to answer our questions. The OMC does have regulatory authority over the motor 
carriers, however, this study does not fall within our authority and therefore the carriers 
have the right not to participate. In all, 18 subjects were loss to follow-up, 13 were loss in 
the second year. The losses were equally spread throughout the groups. 
The major categories that the accident team thought would predict accidents were 
studied and analyzed within this report. 
3.3 Response Variable: 
The questionnaire and the computer system supplied our team with much needed 
data for determining the significance of the variables under consideration. One item 
supplied by the carriers, was a heavily relied on factor, that is the industry-standard accident 
measure is known as the Accident Rate (AR), or it is sometimes called the accidents per 
million miles traveled. This measure is: 
Total Number of Accidents X 1,000,000 
Total Fleet Miles 
3.4 Explanatory (Independent) Variables: 
The following independent variables were used throughout this study: 
Accident Rate in 1994: the carriers total number of accidents for the calendar year, 
multiplied by one million and then divided by the total fleet miles of the company. 47 
The same calculations are then used for 1995, substituting the 1995 information 
into the equation. 
Average Trip Per Driver: each carrier provided this information so that we could 
determine if they were a long distance carrier or generally made local deliveries. 
Percent of Urban Driving: this factor will tell us how much of the drivers time is 
spent delivering within the city versus over the road, long distance and rural 
driving. 
Average Age of Equipment: how old are the vehicles the carrier is operating. 
Driver Turnover Rate: at what rate are the drivers leaving the company. If they 
indicate a high turnover rate, are the drivers leaving for a safety reason? 
Total Out of Service Time, Vehicle Out of Service Time and Driver Out of 
Service Time: vehicles may be stopped by inspectors at any time they are operating 
down the road. They are given a thorough inspection and discrepancies are noted. 
The inspector follows strict guidelines and if the vehicle, driver or both is found 
to have major safety violations, they can not operate (placed out of service) until 
the safety violations are corrected. The results of each inspection are downloaded
 
into our joint agencies computer system known as Safety Net.
 
Miles Per Vehicle in 1994: an average of how many miles are placed on each
 
vehicle the carrier operates.
 
Total Miles Traveled in 1994/1995: all vehicle miles for a given company for one
 
calendar year.
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Median Years of Drivers Experience: have the drivers at the company been 
operating large trucks for many years, or is the company hiring a lot of 
inexperienced drivers. 
The following categorical variables were used in this study: 
Type of Payment for Driver Service: does the carrier pay the drivers per mile, per 
hour, percentage of loads hauled or a combination of these methods? 
Intervention/Treatment Group: the group who utilized the implementation of 
reviewing the situations surrounding an accident, finding the causes and then 
applying the counter measures or solutions suggested in the manual to stop similar 
accidents from occurring again. 
Type of Freight Carried: what commodities are being transported by the carrier 
on a given trip throughout a calendar year. 
Mileage Groups characterizes the trucking company into groups based on the total 
number of miles traveled by their vehicles in the given year. 
3.5 Analysis of Data 
The scope of this study was limited to carriers on the OMC census, which means 
that these carriers have applied for a DOT number and may or may not have been audited 
by our organization in the past. Carriers who have not applied for a DOT number may 
be operating illegally and would not have been included in this study. 
This study is restricted to the accident information obtained by existing motor 
carriers that are based in Oregon. Eligible carriers were asked to furnish, voluntarily, 49 
historical data on their accidents and specifics concerning their company. The person 
interviewed served as the spokesperson for the entire motor carrier and the information 
obtained was not verified by other means, unless they were in the group which had their 
accidents reviewed and received the ACM. Accident and mileage data, was then used to 
calculate and compare the relative rates of accidents. Information concerning the Type 
of Freight carried by the carrier was not utilized because of the huge variety of 
commodities. There was no obvious way of grouping the commodities or companies into 
workable groups. 
The type of statistical methods used to analyze the collection of information 
described above will be standard multiple linear regression (MLR) techniques.  I will 
define a two step protocol using multiple linear regression techniques that will allow to 
first determine and understand the effect of the ACM treatment  on those trucking 
companies who incurred an accident in 1994, secondly, the later stage of our analysis 
protocol will allow us to determine if the effect is similar for trucking companies who did 
not record an accident in 1994 and those who did record an accident in 1994. The first 
stage of this protocol consists of an investigation of a multiple regression model of the 
WITH-population of trucking companies. The response of interest is the accident rate in 
1995 (AR 95). I would like to determine if there is a relationship between AR 95 and the 
ACM program and other explanatory variables described above.  That is, can the 
attributes measured be used as predictors of a trucking companies accident rate? Initial 
graphs examined will be scatter plot matrices of all variables of interest  to assess the 
relationships among all variables. The error or residual showed no serious departures 50 
from normality. There were a couple of outliers, but they did not influence the values of 
the estimated regression parameters, so, the normality of the error was not a problem in 
this data set. 
A typical multiple linear regression (MLR) model has the form: 
y = BO + B lx 1 + B2x2 +  B3x3 
Where the betas (B) represent the effect on the response of each explanatory 
variable. In particular, the effect on AR 95 for a single unit change in the explanatory 
variable x3 is found in the estimated coefficient for B3 while all other variables in our 
model remain fixed. 
For example, if we have an estimated model: 
y = .354 + .017x1 + .042x2 +  -.143x3 
The effects for a single unit change in x3, say median years in driver experience is 
-0.143 units in y, while all other variables in the model remain fixed. That is, the accident 
rate in 1995 decreased by .143 when the median years in driver experience increases by one 
year. Thereby, reflecting the importance of the relation between 1995 accident rates and 
drivers experience. 
The variable selection method will consist of the typical tools used in MLR 
modeling.  Initial graphs of each variable reveal location and spread for each variable. 
Potential outliers and influential observations will be checked using a scatter plot matrix of 
all the variables of interest. In addition, this scatter plot will help us assess the relationship 
among all variables. Issues such as potential multicollinearity of explanatory variables will 51 
be revealed here. The usual diagnostic examinations, residual plots and mean plots, will be 
used to assess the validity of our model. Extra Sum of Squares Principle and resulting F-test 
was employed to test the significance of contribution for all the variables considered in this 
study. This approach allows the user to more actively choose between explanatory variables 
considered and it allows for a simultaneous decision for a collection of variables if none are 
important. 
The second stage of the investigation allows us to consider the consistency of the 
effect, discovered and described by the MLR model determined in stage one of our analysis 
protocol with respect to WITH-population, across the WITH and WITHOUT population 
groups. This comparison is achieved by augmenting the final multiple linear regression 
model, determined in part one of the analysis for the trucking companies who recorded an 
accident in 1994, using indicator variables for WITH and WITHOUT group designation. 
Although the statistical validity of the resulting inference may be questioned, this work 
attempts to provide a more expansive and complicated picture of effect of the ACM program 
and other explanatory variables have on the accident rates for all of the trucking firms based 
in the state of Oregon in 1994 and 1995. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has described the materials and methods used in this study. Discussion 
related to the participants in the study, the accident investigation and interpretation of 
preventable vs: non-preventable, the survey, procedure and the statistical procedures used 
to analyze the data. The results discussed based on the data collected for this study do not 
imply that they are representative of any larger population of trucking firms  or any other 52 
periods of time. I restrict all discussions to the observed set of trucking companies who were 
considered in this study. The reasons for these limitations are many: 
1. Laws change over time, therefore this will have a direct affect on driver performance. 
2. Driver habits do not remain consistent. 
3. Road projects and road quality change over time and may interfere with safety. 
4. Types of equipment utilized differ between companies and safety and comfort features 
have been improved on newer equipment. 
The ACM program was provided to the randomly selected trucking firms, but drivers 
hired after the implementation of ACM may not have been exposed to this information. 53 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The method of multiple linear regression was utilized to determine whether any 
variables in the set of explanatory variables considered in this study are related to the 
accident rate of a company in 1995. In effect, we are trying to explain the variation in the 
accident rate in 1995 (AR 95) using information we believe influences or accounts for the 
incidence of accidents and the corresponding accident rates. 
The set of explanatory variables considered for this study included many variables. 
There were four categorical variables: the invention/treatment group (GROUP), the type 
of payment received for services, mileage group and the type of freight carried in the load 
delivered. There was information collected for thirteen variables of interval type: miles per 
vehicle traveled in 1994, average length of a trip, Percent of travel in urban area, age of the 
equipment used, percentage of driver turnover, total miles traveled in 1994, total miles 
traveled in 1995, percent of out of service time due to a vehicle problem, percent of out of 
service time due to driver problem, total percent of time out of service, median driver 
experience in years, and accident rate in  1994 (AR 94) and in 1995 (AR 95). 
4.1 Findings Related to Major Hypotheses: 
H,: There is a difference in accident rates in 1995 (AR 95) between trucking 
companies which were exposed to the ACM program and trucking companies that were not 
exposed to the ACM program. 
H2: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Median Level of Driver experience for the trucking company. 54 
H3: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Average Length of Trip traveled by a vehicle for the trucking company. 
H4: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Total 
Out of Service Time, Vehicle Out of Service Time, or Driver Out of Service Time for the 
trucking company. 
H5: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Age 
of the Equipment used by the trucking company. 
H6: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Percent of Urban Driving for a vehicle used by the trucking company. 
H7: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Amount of Driver Turnover for the trucking company during the observed period. 
H8: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Miles 
Per Vehicle Driven in 1994 for the trucking company. 
H9: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Type 
of Payment provided to the drivers by the trucking company. 
H10: There is a difference between Drivers who were considered for the ACM 
program (number of accidents equal to or greater than 1) and the drivers who were not 
considered for the ACM program (number of accidents equal to zero). 
The companies selected for this study had a wide range of accident rates in 1995. The 
range of accident rates in 1995 ranged from a low of zero to a maximum of 8.53 per million 
miles, In light of this interesting range for AR 95, we simultaneously examined AR 95 and 
the number of miles the trucking company traveled more closely. We broke AR 95 into 55 
four groups of nearly equal size according to the number of miles the trucking company 
accumulated during the year 1995. The year 1995 was chosen because changes in the 
company could give misleading information regarding their AR 95 value. The three cutoff 
points for the number of miles traveled to break AR 95 into four groups of nearly equal size 
were determined to be: 250,000, 750,000, and 2,211,841. 
Table 4.1 Mean AR 95 for Companies with Different Miles Traveled 
Total Miles 1995  N  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Less Than 250,000  18  0.00  .000  0  0.000 
250,000 to 750,000  25  1.17  2.15  0  8.529 
750,000 to 2.21  19  0.399  .585  0  1.745 
Mill 
More than 2.21  21  0.451  .422  0  1.481 
Mill 
The number of companies for each mileage group described in the table above who 
did not report an incident in 1995 were 18, 18, 12, and 3 respectively. As a result, the mean 
accident rate in 1995 for companies whose vehicles traveled less than 250,000 was zero in 
1995. Clearly, the number of miles traveled results greater propensity for incidents to occur 
and to be reported for the group of companies considered in this study. 
Examination of the mean accident rate also reveals interesting tendencies. Since there 
were no incidents for the group who traveled fewest miles, we focus this discussion on the 
other groups. For the remaining mileage groups, the table above clearly indicates that mean 
AR 95 tends to be lower for companies who vehicles accumulate greater numbers of miles 56 
traveled in 1995 and who exceeded 250,000 total miles traveled in 1995. In addition, since 
the minimum AR 95 for each group is zero, we need only examine the maximum to 
understand the range of accident rates for each group in 1995. As is the case for the mean, 
the maximum AR 95 declines for all groups, except the last, once we move beyond 
companies with fewer miles traveled. However, the last two maximums are very similar 
when we consider the spread (standard deviation) for each group is near four tenths (.40). 
This reduction in accident rates for the mileage groups is an artifact of accident rate 
measures. For instance, suppose we examine a company which travels many miles, say one 
million, and another that travels few miles, say 100,000. Suppose each company has only 
one vehicle which had one reported incident during the year. The company with more 
miles traveled will result in an accident rate in 1995 of one while the company which travels 
fewer miles would have an accident rate in 1995 of ten. So the smaller company has an 
accident rate in 1995 that is ten times larger than the accident rate of the larger company 
even though each company had a single incident. Given that each company had the same 
number of incidents, this disparity may result in one to question whether or not AR 95 is 
a reliable and a quality measure. However, this same model does not take into the account 
the total amount of exposure that larger fleets face and therefore, this model just as easily 
seems to discriminate against the large companies as well as the small. It appears to be a 
reliable and quality measure and is utilized throughout the entire industry as a way of 
calculating their accident rates. This figure gives an "apple to apple" comparison. While a 
smaller company has fewer resources it can use for training, instruction, prevention to 
address and educate it drivers regarding safety, they seem to take more pride in their 57 
equipment and they usually have smaller turnover rate, yet the larger companies seem to 
have more resources. The larger accident rate reflects the importance of educating and 
helping driver recognize and avoid common and uncommon problems during their trips. 
A table of correlation, which measures the strength between two variables, provides 
some insight into the potential of relationships between AR 95 and the individual 
explanatory variables considered in this study. These descriptive correlation's are provided 
in Appendix A.  Also, pairwise correlation's for all interval explanatory variables are 
provided in Appendix A. 
Each question of interest identified for this project is summarized below. For each 
question, a test of hypothesis was performed, to assess the statistical significance of the 
relationship between AR 95 and the explanatory variable.  Each question of interest is 
summarized individually. These are followed by a description and discussion of the final 
model which identifies and communicates the most important explanatory variables 
identified in this study. 
A worthwhile note: 95% of information is within 2 standard deviation, and 67% of 
information is within 1 standard deviation. 
H1: There is a difference in AR 95 between trucking companies exposed to the ACM 
program and trucking companies that were not exposed to the ACM program. 
The mean AR 95 for each group is identified in the table below. Although the means 
appear different, the magnitude of this difference is only .11, and the mean for each group 
is easily within one standard deviation of the mean for the other group which suggests they 
are similar. 58 
Table 4.2 Adjusted AR 95 Means for the Treatment Groups 
GROUP  N  Mean 
ACM  21  0.69 
NON ACM  19  0.80 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the treatment intervention variable. 
The table below summarizes the test of hypothesis for the variable considered, utilizing a 
standard F-test for a categorical variable in a multiple linear regression model. 
Table 4.3 Hypothesis Test Result for Accident Countermeasures 
Source  IMF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Group  1  0.32  0.32  0.18  0.67 
There is no evidence of a relationship between a trucking companies accident rate 
in 1995 and the ACM intervention program. ( F = .18 , p = .67) The difference between 
the mean accident rates for a company which received the accident counter measure 
intervention and a company that did not receive the accident counter measure intervention 
ranges from -.98 to .75 ( 95% Confidence Interval for the difference of means. ) Note that 
since zero is contained in this confidence interval, zero is a plausible value for the difference 
of means for these two groups and the conclusion of no difference between AR 95 for these 
groups is confirmed. 59 
H2: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Median 
Level of Driver experience for the trucking company. 
The average median number of years of driver experience for the companies 
considered in this study is 11.82.  This ranges from a company with a median driver 
experience of two years to a company whose median driver experience is 38 years. The 
company with the high median driving age corresponds to an owner operator who traveled 
58,000 miles in 1994. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the explanatory variable defined by 
the median number of years of experience of the drivers for the company. The table below 
summarizes the test of hypothesis for this variable. 
Table 4,4 Hypothesis Test Result for Median Driver Experience 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Median Driver  1  2.54  2.54  1.56  0.22 
Experience 
There is no evidence of an association between the accident rate of a company in 
1995 and the median number of years of experience of the drivers employed by the 
company. (F = 1.56, p = .22) Even though the relationship is not statistically significant, 
the estimated effect of one year increase in median experience of the drivers for the company 
results in a decrease in the accident rate by .06 (estimated coefficient is -.06) but this 
estimated effect ranges from -.16 to .04 (95% Confidence Interval). Note that since zero is 60 
contained in this interval, zero is a plausible value for the effect on AR 95 for a single unit 
change of the median driver experience, which coincides with our conclusion of no 
relationship between AR 95 and median experience. The variable median driver experience 
was not included in the final model, since it was not statistically related to AR 95. 
H3: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Average 
Length of Trip traveled by a vehicle for the trucking company. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the explanatory variable defined by 
the average length of trip for a drivers for the company. The table below summarizes the 
test of hypothesis for this variable. 
Table 4.5 Hypothesis Test Result for Average Length of Trip 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Average Length  1  0.65  0.65  0.39  0.54 
of Trip 
There is no evidence of an association between the accident rate of a company in 
1995 and the average length of trip traveled by each vehicle of the company. (p = .54) Even 
though the relationship is not statistically significant, the estimated effect of an increase in 
the average trip length by 325 miles results in a decrease in the accident rate by .095 but this 
estimated effect ranges from -.022 to .024 (95% Confidence Interval). 61 
The average trip length was not included in the final model, since it was not 
statistically related to AR 95. 
H4: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Total 
Out of Service Time, Vehicle Out of Service Time, or Driver out of service time for 
the Trucking Company. 
Out of service time for each company was quantified by the percentage of times the 
vehicle was placed out of service on an inspection, due to a vehicle problem and the 
percentage of times placed out of service during an inspection due to a driver issue. The sum 
of these two measures represents the total percentage of times a company vehicle was placed 
out of service from an inspection during the year. Each measure was a percent of the total 
number of inspection conducted on a carrier within the given year. The table of 
correlation's below quantify the strength of the relationships between the measures. In 
addition, a simple test for a significant measure of correlation is provided. 
We see total out of service is highly related to both measures that comprise the total 
out of service time  This is not startling, since total out of service is made up of these 
measures. Neither is the fact that vehicle out of service time is more strongly positively 
related (correlation = .75) to total out of service than is driver out of service time 
(correlation = .397). The disparity in these strengths is largely due to the fact that the mean 
percentage of out of service time due to vehicle problems is 24.3% while the mean out of 
service time due to driver problems is only 3%.  There is little to no evidence of an 
association between out of service time due to driver and out of service time due to vehicle. 62 
As a result of the strong correlation's, total out of service time was never included 
in a model with driver or vehicle out of service time.  This was done to avoid 
multicollinearity in the multiple regression variable selection process. 
Table 4.6 Out of Service Time for the Trucking Company
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > IR1 0 / N = 95
 
Correlation: Out Of Service  Total out of  Vehicle placed  Driver placed out 
service  out of service  of service 
Total out of service  1.00  0.75  0.39 
correlation 
p-value  0.0  .0001  .0001 
Vehicle out of service  0.75  1.00  .004 
correlation 
p-value  .0001  0.0  .97 
Driver out of service  .39  .004  1.00 
correlation 
p-value  .0001  .97  0.0 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for each of the out of service 
explanatory variables. The table below summarizes the test of hypothesis for each 
variable considered. 63 
Table 4.7 Hypothesis Test for Out of Service Time 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Total out of service  1  5.30  5.30  3.24  0.08 
Vehicle out of service  1  3.49  3.49  2.03  0.16 
Driver out of service  1  0.29  0.29  0.17  0.68 
There is no evidence of a relationship between out of service time due to vehicle 
problems (p = .16), nor is there any evidence of a relationship between out of service time 
due to driver problems (p = .68). However, there is moderately suggestive but inconclusive 
evidence of a relationship between the accident rate in 1995 and the total out of service time 
(p = .08).  Thus, the only out of service variable that appears in the final predictive model 
is total out of service time. 
For a one percent increase in total out of service time the AR 95 increases by .02. 
This estimated effect ranges from -.0025 to .05 (95% CI). The fact that zero is near the left 
endpoint of the interval indicates the suggestive evidence this variable provides in the model. 
We choose to include this variable in the final predictive model. 
H5 There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Age of 
the Equipment used by the trucking company. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the explanatory variable defined by 
the age of the equipment used by the company. The table below summarizes the test of 
hypothesis for this variable. 64 
Table 4.8 Hypothesis Test for Age of Equipment 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Equipment age  1  0.96  0.96  0.58  0,45 
There is convincing evidence to show the age of the equipment utilized by  a 
company is not associated with the accident rate of the company in 1995 (F = .58 , p = .45). 
A one year increase in equipment age results in a change of a companies accident rate in 1995 
that ranges from -.07 to .16 with 95% confidence, (95% C.I. for the effect of equipment age). 
The variable equipment age was not included in the final model, since it was not statistically 
related to AR 95. 
H6: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Percent 
of Urban Driving for a vehicle used by the trucking company. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the explanatory variable defined by 
the percent of urban driving for the company, The table below summarizes the test of 
hypothesis for this variable. 
The percent of urban driving reflects the average amount of time the driver operates 
within the city limits. This is a useful variable to consider because of the congested traffic 
a driver may have to deal with on a daily basis, the tight maneuvers they may have to make 
to fit down city streets, while on the other hand, the company making long trips may only 
be operating on the interstate. The average percent of urban driving by vehicle operators 
for the companies considered in this study was 37%. The percent urban driving for the 65 
companies involved in this study ranged from a low of 2% to a high of 100% urban driving. 
Half of the companies indicated this percentage was between 10% and 56%. 
Table 4.9 Hypothesis Test for Percent of Urban Driving 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Percent urban driving  1  11.56  11.56  7.05  0.01 
There is convincing evidence of an association between the percent of urban driving 
and a company's accident rate in 1995. For an increase of one percent more urban driving 
the accident rate of a company would rise by .025 units. We  are 95% confident a one 
percent change increase in urban driving leads to a change between .006 units and .046 units 
(95% C.I). The variable percent of urban was chosen for inclusion into the final estimated 
model for AR 95. 
H7: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Amount of Driver Turnover for the trucking company during the observed period. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the explanatory variable defined by 
the amount of driver turnover for the company. The table below summarizes the test of 
hypothesis for this variable. 66 
Table 4.10 Hypothesis Test for Amount of Driver Turnover 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Driver Turnover  1  0.30  0.30  0.18  0.68 
There is no evidence of a relationship between the driver turnover experienced by 
a company in 1995 and the accident rate of the company in 1995. (F = .18 , p = .68). The 
effect of an increase of one percent driver turnover on AR 95 ranges from -1.58 to 2.42 with 
95% confidence (95% C.I. for the effect of driver turnover on AR 95). The variable driver 
turnover was not included in the final model, since it was not statistically related to AR 95. 
H8: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Miles 
Per Vehicle Driven in 1994 for the trucking company. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the explanatory variable defined by 
the miles per vehicle driven for the company. The table below summarizes the test of 
hypothesis for this variable. 
Table 4.11 Hypothesis Test for Miles Per Vehicle Driven 
Source  DF Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F
 
Miles per vehicle driven  1  33.67  33.67  20.31  0.0001
 
in 1994 67 
We found strong evidence that miles per vehicle driven in 1994 is related to accident rate in 
1995 (F = 20.31 , p = .0001). For each additional 10,000 miles driven per vehicle the 
accident rate will increase by .24 {10,000*.000024}. The range of the effect on AR 95 for an 
increase of miles driven by 10,000 ranges from .18 to .30 (95% C.I.).  The variable miles 
driven per vehicle in 1994 was included in the final estimated model for AR 95. 
H9: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Type 
of Payment provided by the trucking company for a drivers service. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for the explanatory variable defined by 
the type of payment for drivers of the vehicles for the company.  The table below 
summarizes the test of hypothesis for this variable. 
There were four unique method types of pay for the drivers of the companies in this 
study. These methods were hourly, mile, percent, and salary. In addition, these four unique 
methods were combined to form five other payment types for a total of nine unique 
payment types for the drivers in this study. Some payment types were only used for a single 
driver or a couple of drivers. This gives little replication of payment type so  in order to 
create a more viable model we reduced the type of payment to three groups: hourly, 
mileage, and salary. 
Table 4.12 Hypothesis Test for the Type of Payment to Drivers 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Payment type  2  0.88  0.44  0.26  0.77 68 
There is no evidence of an association between the type of pay received by a driver 
employed by the company and the accident rate in 1995 (F = .26, p = .77). 
Table 4.13 Mean Accident Rate for Type of Payment Groups 
Tvoe of Pa  Mean  95% Confidence Limits 
Hour  0.94  0.24  1.63 
Miles  0.63  -0.10  1.36 
Salary  0.52  -0.54  1.57 
Although the means for each pay type category appear to be somewhat different, the 
relative difference is small as the variability in these mean accident rate for the groups show 
the range of the confidence intervals overlap and so they are statistically similar. The 
variable type of pay was not included in the final estimated model, since it was not 
statistically significant. 
The preceding hypotheses were a result of our efforts to find the set of explanatory 
variables that best explain or account for the variation in the accident rates in 1995. In 
summary, for the set of companies who incurred an accident in 1995 we found their accident 
rate in 1995 is related to the miles per vehicle driven in 1994, the percent of urban driving, 
and the total out of service time for the vehicles utilized by the company. The final 
estimated model for AR 95 including all the important (statistically significant) variables 
described above is given by: 
y = -2.36 + .0000226 * miles driven per vehicle in 94 + .025*percent driven urban + 
.022*Total out of service. 69 
The effect on AR 95 by changing the value of each of the explanatory variables in 
the model above is provided in the text that follows the corresponding hypothesis discussed 
above. 
The last step in our analysis was to determine whether the group of companies who 
did not report an accident in 1994 is different from the group of companies who did report 
an accident in 1995. 
H10: There is a difference between Drivers who were considered for the ACM program 
(# of accidents z 1) and the drivers who were not considered for the ACM program 
(# of accidents = 0). 
The list of companies considered for this study was partitioned into three groups. 
These groups were first divided by the occurrence or non-occurrence of at least one accident 
in 1994. Those companies who had a driver involved in at least one incident were then 
divided into two groups, one group was exposed to ACM while the other was not. The 
preceding analysis was performed on the group of companies who had at least one incident 
in 1994. In order to extend our results to all the companies considered for this study, we 
must determine if the associations between the response AR 95 and the explanatory variables 
total out of service discovered for the companies who incurred an accident are the same or 
different for the companies who did not have an incident in 1995. 
The preceding issue can be addressed by augmenting the final estimated model given 
before this hypothesis. Recall, the final estimated model identified above providesus with 
the set of explanatory variables that best explain the variation in AR 95 for this set of 
companies who had an accident in 1994. We will augment the final estimated model by 70 
multiplying each variable by an indicator variable for the control group (1 = those without 
an incident in 1994, 0 = those with an incident in 1994). (The product of the two variables 
can be thought of as an interaction term). The interpretation of the estimated effect of this 
interaction term provides the answer to our question. We will address the question for the 
three important variables identified by the preceding hypothesis tests. 
For example, suppose we consider total out of service. We discovered it was related 
to AR 95. Next, we would like to know if the relationship can be generalized from the 
group of companies who sustained an incident to all the companies considered in this study. 
To do so, we simply examine the importance of the newly constructed product of total out 
of service and Group. If the estimated coefficient for the product is statistically significant, 
then the effect of total out of service on AR 95 is different for the control group and the 
group of companies with an incident. If the estimated coefficient for the product is not 
statistically significant, then the effect of total out of service on AR 95 for the companies 
who had an incident is similar to the effect of total out of service on AR 95 for the 
companies who did not record an incident. 
A formal test of hypothesis was performed for each of the explanatory variable was 
found to be statistically related to AR 95 described in the text above. The tables below 
summarize the test of hypothesis for each of the variables in the final estimated model for 
the ACM/Non ACM groups. 71 
Table 4.14 Hypothesis Test for the Consistency for Total Out of Service 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Total out of service  2  10.05  5.02  3.96  0.02 
'ono accident group 
There is strong evidence to show the effect of total out of service on AR 95 differs 
for the group of companies who did not incur an incident and the companies who did incur 
an accident (F = 3.96, p = .02). The difference of the effect of total out of service on AR 95 
for the two groups is .002. 
Table 4.15 Hypothesis Test for the Consistency of Miles Driven per Vehicle in 1994 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Miles driven per vehicle in  2  18.77  9.39  7.39  0.001 
94 *no accident group 
There is strong evidence to show the effect of miles driven per vehicle in 1994 on AR 
95 differs for the group of companies who did not incur an incident and the companies who 
did incur an accident (F = 7.39, p = .001). The difference of the effect of M94PV on AR 95 
for the two groups is .08 as the effect of M94PV for the control group is .07 for 10,000 mile 
increase in miles per vehicle and the effect of M94PV for the study group is .15 for a 10,000 
mile increase in the M94PV. The effect is more than twice (.15/ .07 > 2) as great for the 
study group than it is for the control group. 72 
Table 4.16 Hypothesis Test for the Consistency of Percent Miles Driven in Urban 
Source  DF  Type III SS  Mean Square  F  Pr > F 
Percent urban driving  2  10.10  5.05  3.98  0.02 
*no accident group 
There is strong evidence to show the effect of percent of urban driving on AR 95 
differs for the group of companies who did not incur an incident and the companies who 
did incur an accident. ( F = 3.98 , p = .02)  The difference of the effect of percent of urban 
driving on AR 95 for the two groups is .0004. 
4.2 Summary: 
This chapter has provided a description of the findings related to the major 
hypothesis, including those which were rejected, and those which were not rejected was 
discussed. In summary, we have determined the effect of miles per vehicle driving in 1994, 
percent of miles driven in urban areas, and total time placed out of service on AR 95 are 
different for the control group and the study group. For the set of companies who incurred 
an accident in 1995 we found their accident rate in 1995 is related to the miles per vehicle 
driven in 1994, the percent of urban driving, and the total out of service time for the vehicles 
utilized by the company. However, it appears the estimated difference is only practically 
significant for miles per vehicle driven in 1994 which indicates an effect of more than twice 
as great for the study group than it is for the control group. It makes sense that a vehicle 
that is operated more frequently is exposed to more opportunities for crashes to occur. 73 
CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND
 
RECOMMENDATIONS
 
This study was designed to analyze the effectiveness of the ACM that are performed 
on accidents that involve motor carriers and to examine and compare different variable 
responses received from randomly selected motor carriers. These variables were reviewed 
and analyzed to see if the variables are predictors or linked to a carriers accident rate. Based 
on findings of the study, this chapter presents a summary of the study, conclusions drawn 
from the data analysis, and recommendations. 
5.1 Summary 
A summary instrument relating to a trucking companies operations was collected 
through a telephonic interview of 100 randomly selected Oregon based carriers. The 100 
carriers were selected initially out of two groups, half had a recordable accident in the DOT 
data base and the other half did not. The 50 carriers with recordable accidents were further 
divided into two groups, those who would receive the accident counter measures and those 
that would not. It was noted that one carrier was affiliated with another carrier from the 
different group. They were placed into the same groups since it was decided that the key 
safety managers and drivers went between the two companies and would affect the results 
of this study. During the initial contact, five of the carriers included in the group indicating 
no accidents were found to be out of business. 
At the end of one year, the carriers were contacted again. An additional 13 carriers 
were lost to follow-up. Eight carriers had moved or gone out of business and five simply 
refused to supply the answers to the questionnaire. There were a total of 18 carriers lost to 74 
follow-up in all, leaving the two groups similar in size. The ending count was 40 in the 
group who initially reported accidents and 42 in the group without accidents. 
The following hypotheses were developed and tested: 
HI: There is a difference in accident rates in 1995 (AR 95) between trucking 
companies which were exposed to the ACM program and trucking companies that were not 
exposed to the ACM program. 
H2: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Median Level of Driver experience for the trucking company. 
H3: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Average Length of Trip traveled by a vehicle for the trucking company. 
H4: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Total 
Out of Service Time, Vehicle Out of Service Time, or Driver Out of Service Time for the 
trucking company. 
H5: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Age 
of the Equipment used by the trucking company. 
H6: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Age 
of the Equipment used by the trucking company. 
H7: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the 
Amount of Driver Turnover for the trucking company during the observed period. 
H8: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Miles 
Per Vehicle Driven in 1994 for the trucking company. 75 
H9: There is a relationship between the AR 95 for trucking companies and the Type 
of Payment provided to the drivers by the trucking company. 
H10: There is a difference between Drivers who were considered for the ACM 
program (number of accidents equal to or greater than 1) and the drivers who were not 
considered for the ACM program (number of accidents equal to zero). 
5.2 Conclusions 
The results of the analysis of the first hypothesis, Hl: There is a difference in 
accident rates in 1995 (AR 95) between trucking companies which were exposed to the 
ACM program and trucking companies that were not exposed to the ACM program, 
presented unexpected findings. During an audit, an investigator must review each accident 
record and all police and insurance reports a carrier has. The investigator then enters the data 
into the computer and furnishes the carrier with recommendations from the ACM program. 
These recommendations are designed to curb future similar accidents from occurring, by 
altering either the drivers habits, maintenance checks or managers procedures. It was expected 
that with all the work, time and energy utilized to investigate an accident and recommend 
the counter measures, that there would be a strong relationship to the following years 
accident rate and the ACM. This was not the case. The finding of this study indicate that 
there is no evidence of a relationship between the two. The main purpose of this study was 
to examine this first hypothesis. OMC's main concern is to ensure the public that we are 
regulating the trucking industry in such a way as to allow only the safest of all trucks on our 
highways. OMC wants to reduce accidents and has implemented policies and procedures 
such as the ACM program to reach these goals. As a Safety Investigator, I was hoping that 76 
this study would show a decrease in accidents among the carriers who received and 
implemented the ACM. Had the outcome of this study been favorable, it could have been 
used as a tool, giving the investigators more pride in their work. The safety investigator would 
know that they were out there reducing injuries and fatalities by introducing the ACM program 
to carriers with accidents, therefore justifying their position and actions. 
One item I would like to inject at this point is that while the carrier is supplied the 
countermeasures, no interviews were conducted with the drivers or maintenance personnel to 
see if any of the countermeasures were actually put into action. The person being interviewed 
for the study may have received the countermeasures and then proceeded to do absolutely 
nothing with them. Similarly, when an audit is conducted with a carrier, interviews are not 
generally conducted with the drivers to ensure follow through. However, this study was strictly 
voluntary, while an audit is not. The carriers know the consequences of an audit could lead into 
civil forfeiture, criminal sanctions or placing the company out of business and may take 
different actions when receiving the recommendations during those circumstances, than 
through a voluntary study. 
In summary, we have determined the findings related to the major hypotheses which 
are statistically significant are the effect of miles per vehicle driven in 1994, percent of miles 
driven in urban areas, and total out of service on AR 95. That is, they are different for the 
control group and the study group. For the set of companies who incurred an accident in 
1995 we found their accident rate in 1995 is related to the miles per vehicle driven in 1994, 
the percent of urban driving, and the total out of service time for the vehicles utilized by the 
company. However, it appears the estimated difference is only practically significant for 77 
miles driven per vehicle in 1994 which indicates an effect of more than twice as great for the 
study group than it is for the control group. 
It makes sense that the more miles a vehicle is driven, the more opportunity it has to 
incur an accident.  Miles driven is one of the factors an insurance company utilizes in 
determining an insurers rate. More miles, more exposure and more chance of crashes. Maybe 
the large issue of fatigue is involved with the higher number of miles driven too, since the 
driver would have to spend more time in the vehicle, the irregular sleep patterns, and many 
other factors that long distance drivers must face. 
The relationship of urban driving to accidents seems easy to explain and deals with 
exposure also. The city is more congested, harder to manipulate a big rig through, there fore, 
more crashes may be expected here than on the open, straight barren highways. 
The relationship of total out of service time of the company to accidents is somewhat 
more difficult to explain, but still makes sense.  If a carrier has a tight regime on vehicle 
maintenance, watches over their drivers and complies with the Federal regulations, they are not 
being placed out of service when they are pulled in for vehicle and driver inspections. The 
vehicles that are being placed out of service are the ones who did not receive proper, routine 
maintenance, or the drivers are operating with false records or are driving over the hours of 
service limitations. It should not surprise anyone to see that the companies with a higher out 
of service rate are the same ones with a higher accident rate. If the drivers are operating faulty 
equipment or are fatigued while operating, a crash may be inevitable. 
Many of these issues are difficult to separate out and point to just one cause as the 
creator of the accident.  I believe a person must take an eclectic approach and look at the 78 
overall picture, reviewing a combination of items that occurred prior to an accident taking place 
to reach a conclusion. While the other items reviewed in this study did not appear to be 
statistically significant, these items should not be completely dismissed as elements involved 
or contributing to the accidents. 
5.3 Recommendations 
The present study subjected randomly selected motor carriers to a questionnaire 
consisting of numerous variables, thought to perhaps be linked to accident causation or 
accident rates. A group of these motor carriers had their accidents reviewed and ACM were 
implemented. This study indicates that there is no evidence of a relationship between a 
trucking companies accident rate and the ACM. In fact, seven of the ten hypotheses 
indicated there were no association, while three did appear to be statistically significant. It 
has been determined the effect of miles driven per vehicle in 1994, percent of miles driven 
in urban areas and the total out of service rate on the Accident Rate 1995 are different for 
the control group and the study group. Carrying it even further, when placing the numbers 
into a practical situation, the only factor that seems to be practically significant is the miles 
driven per vehicle in 1994. 
In the long term, further research is suggested in the specific areas of (1) the 
effectiveness of ACM on motor carriers throughout the United States (2) the reason that 
miles driven per vehicle in 1994 is statistically significant (are these drivers operating over 
the hours of service requirements or speeding to finish a run?) and (3) the effectiveness of 
road side inspections, do they help safety factors? 79 
The Safety Investigators are given instructions on proper procedures to follow when 
conducting an audit.  If these procedures, intended to improve the safety of others, are 
shown to be ineffective or not appear to be statistically significant, the procedures need to 
be re-evaluated. Perhaps we are not utilizing our time in the most efficient and effective 
matter. I would like to be certain that the job I do and the time I invest is helpful, that is the 
reason I chose this position. When the study is conducted on carriers who are undergoing 
an audit, the actual implementation of the Accident Countermeasures needs to be measured. 
Drivers and mechanics need to be included in the study to ensure that the countermeasures 
are actually changing the way they  conduct themselves.  This will measure the 
implementation of the countermeasures rather than just that the countermeasures were given 
to the carrier. This may then show that the efforts of the investigator are not fruitless, and 
that the recommendations are going further than the safety director or president of a 
company. 
The answers lie, first, in providing a safe and efficient transportation system for all 
of the motoring public and second in the direct safety issues of each individual trucking 
company and driver. If the current programs are not meeting the needs of these carriers 
and drivers to reduce their accident rates, then new innovative, "out of the box" paradigm 
shift thinking and implementation needs to occur. 
One way to think out of that box, would be to utilize technology to reduce the 
numbers of crashes. Many carriers already use some form of advanced system to track 
their drivers, perhaps mandatory transponders that record every move made by a vehicle 
would eliminate the hours of service violations, cutting back on fatigued drivers, thus 80 
resulting in less crashes. Trucking companies, like many businesses do not want more 
government involvement or supervision, but I do not think we can sit back and accept 
these numbers of lives lost as a cost of doing business. There must be a betterway and the 
government may need to be more involved in this process. 
Another way to think outside of the box, would be to make the person who 
demands the driver to make the trip, assume the full cost of the accident. Whether this 
person is the supervisor or a dispatcher, if they have knowledge that the driver is violating 
a hours of service regulation and directs them to keep moving, they could be held liable. 
This would surely cut back on the number of trips that are operated illegally. The over 
zealous dispatchers taking advantage of the truck drivers, may tend to think twice before 
directing an illegal move. 
Regulations may need to be tighter on the trucking industry, rather than following 
the ongoing trend of fewer laws. Five thousand deaths a year involving truck collisions 
can not be accepted as the norm. Zero tolerance is the goal of many supporters and zero 
fatalities should be the goal of any person involved in transportation safety. 81 
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Appendix A
 
Variable Summary Correlations
 
Variable  Type  Definition of Variable Name
 
CARRIER  Nominal  Name of the company
 
PYTYP  Nominal  Type of Payment Received for Completion of the Job
 
TOFFRT  Nominal  Type of Freight Hauled
 
GROUP  Nominal  Treatment Group
 
DOT94REC  Interval  Department of Transportation for 1994
 
DOT95REC  Interval  Department of Transportation for 1995
 
TOT94PRV  Interval  Total Preventable Accidents in 1994
 
TOT95PRV  Interval  Total Preventable Accidents in 1995
 
REC94PRV  Interval  Recordable/Prevenatable 1994
 
REC95PRV  Interval  Recordable/Prevenatable 1995
 
MED94RP  Interval  median cost of recordable 1994
 
MED95RP  Interval  median cost of recordable 1995
 
TOTPOW  Interval  Total power units
 
TOT94M  Interval  Total Miles travelled in 1994
 
TOT95M  Interval  Total Miles travelled in 1995
 
AVETRIP  Interval  Average length of a trip
 
PRCTMURB  Interval  Percent of Urban Driving
 
DRVTRN  Interval  Driver Turnover
 
EQPAGE  Interval  Age of the Equipment used
 
VEHOOS  Interval  Vehicle Out of Service Time
 
DRVOOS  Interval  Driver Out of Service Time
 
TOTOOS  Total Out of Service Time
 
MEDDRVEX  Median Driver Experience
 
AR94  Accident Rate in 1994
 
AR95  Accident Rate in 1995
 
Variable Summary
 
acm= accident counter measures
 
control= group with no accidents
 
non acm= no treatment given
 
GROUP 
Cumulative  Cumulative 
GROUP  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent 
acm  24  25.3  24  25.3 
control  45  47.4  69  72.6 
non acm  26  27.4  95  100.0 88 
Driver Payment Type
 
Cumulative  Cumulative
 
Type  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent
 
hour  1  1.1  1  1.1
 
hour & mile  11  11.6  12  12.6
 
hour & percent  3  3.2  15  15.8
 
hourly  35  36.8  50  52.6
 
mile  13  13.7  63  66.3
 
mile & hour  5  5.3  68  71.6
 
mile & percent  1  1.1  69  72.6
 
na  7  7.4  76  80.0
 
percent  8  8.4  84  88.4
 
salary  9  9.5  93  97.9
 
salary & mile  1  1.1  94  98.9
 
salary & percent  1  1.1  95  100.0
 
Type of Freight Tranpsorted (TOFFRT)
 
Continuous Variables. 
Variable  N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
DOT94REC  95  1.5263158  2.2257779  0  12.0000000 
DOT95REC  82  1.6341463  2.6597698  0  15.0000000 
TOT94PRV  95  8.3263158  21.9779590  0  170.0000000 
TOTPRV  82  7.6829268  13.2356403  0  52.0000000 
REC94PRV  95  0.9684211  1.4399515  0  8.0000000 
REC95PRV  82  0.8902439  1.4657076  0  6.0000000 
MED94RP  78  6030.67  11854.28  0  49750.00 
MED95RP  78  8010.36  21806.26  0  150000.00 
TOTPOW  95  37.8736842  53.7207599  1.0000000  265.0000000 
TOT94M  93  2298485.44  3948427,73  28000.00  18500000.00 
TOT95M  82  2411048.93  4118968.07  24000.00  18165726.00 
AVETRIP  91  325.4285714  434.8485341  5.0000000  2500.00 
PRCTMURB  88  0.3700000  0.3064517  0.0200000  1.0000000 
DRVTRN  92  0.2383696  0.3764767  0  3.0000000 
EPPAGE  89  7.1853933  4.2449047  1.0000000  20.0000000 
VEHOOS  95  0.2430526  0.2112681  0  1.0000000 
DRVOOS  95  0.0302105  0.1090772  0  1.0000000 
TOTOOS  95  0.2864211  0.2262032  0  1.0000000 
MEDDRVEX  86  11.8255814  6.9183335  2.0000000  38.0000000 
AR94  93  1.5865369  4.6537467  0  35.7142857 
AR95  82  0.5611858  1.3003436  0  8.5287846 
M94PV  93  59823.93  45804.89  2603.77  246857.14 89 
Cumulative  Cumulative
 
TOFFRT  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent
 
5th wheels  1  1.1  1  1.1 
asphalt  2  2.1  3  3.2 
bark dust  1  1.1  4  4.2 
beer/household  1  1.1  5  5.3 
building mat  2  2.1  7  7.4 
chips  2  2.1  9  9.5 
concrete  1  1.1  10  10.5 
construction material  1  1.1  11  11.6 
containers  1  1.1  12  12.6 
dirt, rock  1  1.1  13  13.7 
dry food  1  1.1  14  14.7 
equipment  mach  3  3.2  17  17.9 
fertilizer  1  1.1  18  18.9 
flowers  1  1.1  19  20.0 
food products  1  1.1  20  21.1 
frozen food  1  1.1  21  22.1 
garbage  2  2.1  23  24.2 
general  19  20.0  42  44.2 
grain & Fert  1  1  1  43  45.3 
gravel/asphalt  1  1.1  44  46.3 
grocery/frozen  2  2.1  46  48.4 
haz mat  1  1.1  47  49.5 
heating oil  1  1.1  48  50.5 
heavy equipment  1  1.1  49  51.6 
household  1  1.1  50  52.6 
ice creme  1  1.1  51  53.7 
industrial goods  1  1.1  52  54.7 
instant lawn  1  1.1  53  55.8 
live stock  1  1.1  54  56.8 
log & general  1  1.1  55  57.9 
logs  6  6.3  61  64.2 
logs/lumber  2  2.1  63  66.3 
lumber  6  6.3  69  72.6 
machines  1  1.1  70  73.7 
mail  1  1.1  71  74.7 
milk  1  1.1  72  75.8 
moving  1  1.1  73  76.8 
na  6  6.3  79  83.2 
paper products  2  2.1  81  85.3 
paper roll  1  1.1  82  86.3 
passengers  2  2.1  84  88.4 
plants  1  1.1  85  89.5 
produce  1  1.1  86  90.5 
rock/concrete  1  1.1  87  91.6 
sand  1  1.1  88  92.6 
seafood  1  1.1  89  93.7 
steele prod  1  1.1  90  94.7 
tow a way  1  1.1  91  95.8 
utility vehi  1  1.1  92  96.8 
waste oil  1  1.1  93  97.9 
wood prod  2  2.1  95  100.0 90 
Appendix B
 
Accident Team Data Sheet
 
Office of Motor Carriers
 
Oregon Division
 
Accident Team Data Sheet
 
General Carrier Information: 
Motor Carrier:  USDOT: 
Tot. Prev. Accidents:  Tot. Rec. Acc's:  Tot. Rec/Prev Acc's: 
Median Cost/Prev Acc: $  Median Cost/Recordable/Prev: $ 
Power Units:  Tot. Drivers:  Total Miles Operated: 
Operational Data: 
Average Length of Trip (manifested load, not round trip):  miles
 
Percent of miles in urban environment (close approximation):
 
Type of Freight:
 
How is dispatcher paid (by #'s of loads, %, hourly etc.):
 
How is driver paid (by the load, % of load, by the mile, hourly):
 
Driver turnover rate (close approximation, # of W-4's issued for previous year):
 
Median Driver Age:  Median Driver exper. (specify # of yrs or mo's)
 
Driver starting pay: $  Top driver pay: $
 
Average age of equipment:
 
Financial Data: 
Operating Ratio (Expenses/Income):  Profit Margin (Net Income/Net Sales): 
Office Use only: 
Safety Net 00S Rate: Vehicle: Driver:  Total:
 
Overwt violation History: # of viol's  median overwt amt:
 
PUC accidents: DOT recordable:  DOT Rec/prev acc:
 
OMC SCE Rating:
 
OMC Carrier Safety Rating (circle one) unsat  / cond / sat
 
Previous4Enforcement (circle one) y / n
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Appendix C 
Accident Team Follow up 
Office of Motor Carriers
 
Oregon Division
 
Accident Team Data Sheet
 
1995 Followup Carrier Information
 
Motor Carrier: 
Total Preventable Accidents 
Total Recordable Accidents 
Total Rec/Prev Accidents 
Median Cost Prey Accident: $ 
Median Cost Rec/Prev Accident: $ 
Total Miles Operated: 
Current SafetyNet 00S Rate: Vehicle:  Driver:  Total: 